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This thesis concentrates on the question of whether or not voluntary, treatment 
incapable patients who have had their treatment consented to by a substitute 
decision-maker can be involuntarily treated. It is my opinion that under the current 
legislative scheme in Ontario the restraint of a voluntary, treatment incapable 
patient for the purposes of treatment is illegal subject to the following exceptions: 
a) a guardianship order exists that contains authority to restrain and 
detain; or 
b) a Power of Attorney for Persona1 Care has been executed by the now 
treatment incapable individual authorizing his substitute decision- 
maker to have him detained and restrained for the purposes of 
treatment . 
While some have suggested legislative reform to alleviate the possibility of this 
situation o c c h g ,  1 do not endorse this suggestion. Instead, the use of advance 
directives should be encouraged, as well as the education of the penon with the 
mental illness, famiiy members, fkiends, health care providers, the legal 
community and membea of the Consent and Capacity Board regarding the powers 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the mid 19" century, the law in Ontario permitted the detention of persons in 
asylums on the basis that they were deemed to be "lunatics." Once admitted to an 
asylum, treatment was given. In general, in the Ontario of years past, once 
diagnosed as a person with mental illness, treatment was automatically 
administered. Such "treatment" often consisted of extremely invasive procedures 
that are considered today as acts of abuse.' 
Over time, however, it was acknowledged that the state required more justification 
to deny the fkeedom of persons with mental illnesses. This resulted in a narrowing 
of the cornmitment c rite ria.^ In addition, the mere fact that one was a patient in a 
psychiatnc facility, or even an involuntary patient, no longer automatically 
authorized the imposition of treatment-consent was required.' 
Incremental changes have included increased procedural protections4 and the 
acknowledgment that competent patients have the right to make decisions 
'For examples such as surgical interventions, forced emetics, and depatterning, 
see Chapter 1. 
2The criteria was narrowed in the -ta1 H o u s  Act, S.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 20. 
See p. 8. 
'See Chapter 2, pages 80-83. 
40ntario instituted review boards in the Mental Act. 1967, S.O. 1967, c. 51 
and patient's rights advice with the introduction of the Psychiatrie Patient Advocate's 
Office in 1982. 
regarding treatment, including the refusal of treatment? Legislation was also 
introduced to put in place a system whereby a substitute decision-maker may be 
authorized to consent to treatment on behalf of an incapable person6 
From grave abuses of the past, the approach towards the mentally il1 has swung 
like a pendulum to a sharp focus on the "nghts" of persons with mental illnesses. 
Many groups and individuals have expressed dissatisfaction with the current 
Ontario legislation, stating it is too liberal, preventing the detention and treatment 
of persons with mental illnesses, with debirnental consequences to the patient and 
increased danger to society.' In particular, many people feel that hospitals are 
prohibited fiom forcing treatment on voluntary patients who are incapable of 
making treatment decisions even when substitute decision-makers believe 
treatrnent to be in the best interest of the patient. They propose that the current 
'~imothy Appelby and Ji11 Mahoney, "Fear Underground: Coping with Subway 
Shovings" The Globe and (7 February 1998) Al ; Michael Valpy, "Mental Illness: 
Cleaning out the Cuckoo's Nest" The Globe and (7 March 1998) D 1 ; David Frum, 
"Report on Mentally Il1 Lacks Recommendations" The London Free Press (1 3 June 
1 998); Jim Moms, "Take Mentally Ill off Street, Jury Urges" n e  Globe and (26 
November 1997) A12; Rory Leishman, "Cease Abandonhg Mentally Ill" Jke London 
Free Press (4 May 1998) C 1. 
3 
legislative scheme in Ontario does not permit forced treatment of al1 vol~ntary,~ 
treatment incapable9 patients who refuses to take medication orally, or to comply 
with procedures such as electroconvulsive therapy, even when the appropriate 
substitute decision-maker has provided consent." They believe this to be 
evidence of a system of legislation in need of reform. 
In this thesis 1 will center on the questions of whether: 
a) the forced treatrnent of voluntary , treatment incapable patients 
is prohibited under Ontario law; and, if so, 
b) whether it should be. 
1 will first present a review of the history of cornmitment and treatment of persons 
with mental illnesses in Ontario since the 19" century. The medical procedures 
andor medications employed by psychiatrists during this period will also be 
highlighted. Such a review serves as a cautionary backdrop against which current 
approaches to the care of persons with mental illness should be assessed. 
1 will then provide a thorough review of the current Ontario law. In Chapter 2,1 
k'~oluntary" means essentially that the person must be discharged on hîs or her 
request. See Chapter 2, p. 36-38. 
'A person is txeatrnent incapable if he or she cannot understand or appreciate the 
consequences of giving or refusing consent. See Chapter 2, p. 67-68. 
1°See Chapter 2, p. 92. 
4 
outline the mental health legislation in Ontario regarding hospitalization and 
treatment that is contained in the Meml He& AC&'' the Substitute Decisions . . 
Act. 1992,'' and the &&b Care Co- Act. 1 996.13 Through this Chapter 1 will 
demonstrate that, under Ontario law, health care providers are prevented f?om 
forcing treatrnent on voluntary patients who are not capable of making treatment 
decisions. l4 
In Chapter 3, 1 will present ethical and policy considerations in relation to the 
current Ontario law. Particularly, what are the arguments for and against the 
involuntary treatment of voluntary, treatment incapable patients who refuse to 
comply with treatment that has been consented to by their substitute decision- 
maker? M i l e  there are compelling arguments on both sides 1 believe that a 
contextual review will demonstrate such treatment cannot be justified. 
Finally, despite recognizing that the current legislative scheme is not without 
"R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7. 
"With the exception that some voluntary, treatment incapable patients may be 
involuntaril y treated when appropriate authority is in place through a guardianship order, 
or Power of Attorney for Persona1 Care. These exceptions will be M e r  expanded in 
Chapter 2. 
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shortcomings, in Chapter 4 1 will argue that the legislation should not be 
reformed. 1 will review and dismiss suggestions to broaden the cornmitment 
criteria, to increase power to the substitute decision-maker, andor to mandate that 
al1 voluntary patients be competent to consent to treatment and admission. 1 will 
also dismiss suggestions that application could be made to the court under its 
pa ra s  patriae jurisdiction. 1 will then review and accept suggestions to encourage 
the use of advance directives, and to educate health care providen, family and 
fkiends, the legal community, and members of the Consent and Capacity Board 
regarding the cument legislative scheme that attempts to balance competing 
societal and individual rights. 
CHAPTER 1-HISTORY 
I n  troductieg 
In this chapter, 1 will briefly review the historical treatment of the mentally il1 in 
Ontario over the past two centuries. This review will focus on the law regarding 
commitrnent, the law regarding consent to treatment, and practice (as illuminated 
by descriptions of procedures used in the treatment of mental illness). 
1 believe that it is instructive to review this history of persons with mental illnesses 
in Ontario to provide a backdrop against which any proposed changes to the 
current legislation can be reviewed. Such a review will be instructive regarding the 
nature of the legislation, and it will also provide insight into the nature of 
discrimination that persons with mental illnesses have faced in the past. Any 
consideration of changes to the current legislation must ensure that similar 
injustices will not be repeated. 
1. O . O - ewew of the b w  R w  Co- 
The treatment of those persons with mental illnesses in Ontario during the late 19" 
and early 20" century was similar to that in England and the United States. The 
rich mentally il1 were cared for at home or discreetly placed in private asylums in 
7 
order to protect the reputation of the family." The poor mentally il1 often became 
the responsibility of the comrnunity: a local family was often paid to care for such 
individuals, but if the cost became prohibitive, the person was often driven nom 
the cornmunity. Many eventually became residents of the "poor house". However, 
because of problems with overcrowding, the mentally il1 began to be placed apart 
fkom the poor in asylums under the As- Act. 18 1 7.16 In order to 
prevent overcrowding and taxing the public purse, rules were established regarding 
who could be granted admission: thus, the issue of committal arose. 
The law regarding comrnittal of persons with mental illnesses has centered around 
two major issues: fmt, the basis for committal, and second, the power to commit. 
Persons were comrnitted to asylums simply because they had been diagnosed as 
"iunatics". An Act Respecthg Asvlums for the I n s m ,  1870-7 1," authorized the 
involuntary detention of a person by way of a medicaf certificate signed by three 
" ~ a r r e n  Thomas Reich, ed. Mcylopedia of R i o e w  (revised edition) (Toronto: 
Simon and Schuster and Prentice Hall International, 1995) at 1927-28. 
16Michael Bay, "The Ontario Mental Health Act" (1997) 17:4 Health Law in 
Canada 124. Bay relates that the reason the mentally ili were separated fiom the poor was 
that they began to fil1 the poor houses. As a control measure, the admission to the new 
asylums required an order of the justice of the peace. 
physicians. The Act provided that : 
6. Such certificate shall state that the inspecting medical 
practitioners at the same time, and in the presence of each other, 
exarnined the patient, and afier due enquiry into al1 necessary facts 
relating to his case, found him to be a lunatic. 
7. Such certificate shall be sufficient authority to any person to 
convey the lunatic to any of the said Asylums, and to the authonties 
thereof to detain him therein so long as he continues to be insane." 
Involuntary committal as a result of being diagnosed as a "lunatic" continued until 
1950, when the legislation was revised such that, to be admitted into a psychiatrie 
facility, a person had to have a mental illness and "...requires care, supervision and 
control for his own protection or welfare, or for the protection of others."lg 
By 1877 the Ontario statute regarding "Lunatic Asylums and the Custody of Insane 
~ersons"'~ provided two routes of admission to an asylum. The highlights of each 
avenue are as follows: 
"S.O. 1870-71, c. 18, ss. 6 and 7. 
Act, S.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 20 (2) (m). It should be noted that 
the legislation fiom the 1870s to the 1950s changed litde in substance regarding 
admission to an asylum and the route by which admission was granted. 
20 Custodv of Insane Pers- R.S.O. 
1877, c. 220. 
I Route 1-Medical Certifîcate 
-required signature of 3 doctors2' 
-critenon for admission: person was a 
lunatic2' 
-superintendent had to approve both 
the admission and discharge of any 
person admitted by way of a medical 
certi f i ~ a t e ~ ~  
Route 2-Lieutenant Governor's 
-information given to a Justice of the 
Peace that indicated the person was 
"...insane and dangerous to be at 
large.. ."24 
-the Justice of the Peace could issue a 
warrant to have the person conducted 
to jails 
-the jail surgeon and another doctor 
could issue a medical certificateZ6 
-a county Judge would also have to 
issue an order of committa12' 
-al1 above subject to the approval of 
the Department of the Provincial 
secret+' 
-once approved, a warrant was issued 
to conduct the person fiom the jail to 
the a ~ y l u r n ~ ~  
As- and the Custodv of Insane Persons, R.S.O. 
1877, c .  220, S. 8. 
291bidt Note: for additional explanation regarding the provisions of this Act, see 
S.E.D. Shortt, -cv -d M. Bucke Practice of Late Nineteenth, 
Centurv Ps vchiatrv) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 5 1 .  
By 1 9 3 ~ ~ '  the power to commit was placed entuely within the domain of 
physicians: no aspect required the approval of a member of the judiciary." 
The revised process of committai was criticized as offering few protections to 
those persons wrongfully detained. In 1938 after a lawyer acquaintance of Premier 
Mitchell Hepburn complained to him that he had been irnprisoned at London 
Psychiatric Hospital for three years, despite the fact that he alleged he had not been 
s u f f e ~ g  &om a mental disorder, an inquiry was estab1i~hed.j~~ series of 
recommendations, including the introduction of regular boards of review to 
monitor patients' detentions, was made.33 Few of the recomrnendations were 
Act. 1935, S.O. 1935, c. 39. The precise reasons for the 
change to the commitment procedures is not entirely clear to me as a person who is not a 
historian, but the 1930s were a time of much change surrounding mental health in 
Ontario. These changes included: 
a) an increased push for out patient treatment centres. In 193013 1 the 
Department of Health opened six clinics in Ontario but these were soon 
abandoned as unworkable (e.g. much of the staffs time was spent 
administering I.Q. tests to single rnothers because a popular belief of the 
day equated motherhood outside of marriage to mental retardation); 
b) the introduction of Approved Boarding Homes ( in 1 93 3); 
C) reform on the commitment procedures; and 
d) the belief that mental iilness was a disease just like other medical illnesses 
and therefore, subject to cure. Many new treatments, developed in Europe, 
encouraged psychiatrists to push for changes to legitimize their profession. 
See Harvey G. Simmons, m e d :  M a  H u  Pol~cy in Ontario 1930-1 989 . . 
(Toronto Wall and Thompson, 1990) at ix and 47-49. 
"Bay, ylpfa note 16 at 124. 
"Simmons, s y ~ ~ n  note 30 at 9. 
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implemented: indeed it was not until 1967 that review boards were established in 
Ontario. 
Criticisms of the Mental He-t in Ontario continued. In the mid 1960s, a 
farmer on the Bruce Peninsula drove a tax collector off his property with a 
shotg~n.)~ The man was comrnitted to the Penetanguishene Mental Hospital but 
hired a lawyer and spoke in the press of his treatment." After an application was 
made for habeas corpus, a judge appointed a board to review the ~ituation.'~ 
Although the board never met because the farmer was discharged the day prior to 
the meeting, the episode led to the passage of Ontario's first Mental H e m  AC[.)' 
The Mental Health Act. 1967 statutorily provided for review boards3* and more 
"Bay, note 16 at 124. 
"LbiQ It should be noted that Ontario did have a previous Act entitled the 
"Mental Hedth Acf' (S.O. 1954, c. 50). That Act was purely an administrative directive 
as set out in S. 2 for the Minister and department officiais to "...promote and encourage 
the establishment and CO-ordination of facilities for the accumulation and dissemination 
of information relating to mental health, and advise and assist local boards, medical 
officers of health, public hospitals and other persons and institutions in ail matters 
pertaining to mental health." 
stringent cnteria for involuntary commitment than had been in place in the past.19 
S. 8 of the Act incorporated a dangerousness-oriented criterion: 
8.--(1) Any person who, 
(a) suffers fkom mental disorder of a nature or degree 
so as to require hospitalization in the interests of his 
own safety or the safety of others; and 
(b) is not suitable for admission as an informa1 patient, 
may be admitted as an involuntary patient to a psychiatric 
facility upon application therefore in the prescribed fom 
signed by a phy~ician.~' 
The Mental Health Act has been arnended in 1978, 1986, 1987, 1992 and 1996 
(with the creation of the &&h Care Consent Act. 1 99641).4' These amended Acts 
reflect the continued focus on the need for procedural protections for persons with 
39MedHealth Act. 1967, S.O. 1967, c. 51, S. 8. See also Bay, ~ur>rai note 16 at 
124. 
'% should be noted that the number of physicians required to commit a person to 
a psychiacric facility has decreased steadily throughout the years. For example, the 
Provincial Luliptic A s a  Act, S.O. 1853 (16 V.) c. 188, s. 7; ,4n Act -CU 
Asvlums for the Insane, S.O. 1870-71, c. 18, S. 5; and An Act Re-
A ! + ,  Cwtodv of 1-e Persofl~, R.S.O. 1877, c. 220, s. 8, al1 required the 
signature of 3 physicians for comrnittal. By 1887, however, only 2 physicians were 
required to provide certificates for committal: see A  L-ic As- 
and the Custodv of -, R.S.O. 1887, c. 245, S. 7; M s  for the In- 
Act, R.S.O. 1914, c. 295, S. 7; and the M e n a  Hosi>itals Act, S.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 20 (1). 
The Mental Hwlth Act. 1967. S.O. 1967, c. SI, S. 8 (1) required only one physician to 
complete a certificate that resulted in involuntary commitment and t h i s  requirement 
continues today; see the M e n m t h  Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 1. 
"S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
"Bay, note 16 at 1%. The curent state of the law, as outlined in the 1996 
arnendrnents, will be discussed more Mly in Chapter 2. 
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mental illnesses, as well as the conflict between balancing the rights of such 
persons with the duty to provide tare.“) 
ILL view of theLaw Re- Consent to TreatmplLt . 
Persons with mental illnesses were often deemed to have no ability to make 
decisions of any kind for themselves: the mere presence of mental illness 
correlated to a finding of incapacity to make any decisions. As Dr. C. A. Roberts 
explained: 
It didn't occur to me with a certified patient, any more than with a 
prisoner, that there was any question of asking them whether or not 
they wanted treatment. They had been brought to hospital mentally 
ill, incapable of judgment or decision, so they were treated. That 
was tme of mental hospitals, prisons, homes for the aged, and county 
homes. Forrnalized consents were a postwar devel~pment.~ 
Since it did not occur to many physicians that persons with mental illness could 
make decisions regarding their care, who provided consent? In keeping with the 
belief that the physician knew best what was appropriate for his or her patients, 
traditionally, the superintendent of the provincial psychiatric hospitals assumed 
much of the decision-making capacity for al1 the patients in the institution: 
The superintendent ruled supreme within the hospital, the patients 
were his subjects and however kindly an individual superintendent 
4 3 ~ h e  conflict between liberty and beneficence will be discussed more fûily in 
Chapter 3. 
41~imrnons, note 30 at 225. 
rnight feel toward these subjects they were, ultirnately at his mercy 
and the mercy of the hospital staff. By claiming they were acting in 
the patients' best interests, psychiatrists could solemnly invoke 
intrusive and cruel treatments without anyone raising an eyebrow? 
The loss of control over one's body and other rights by virtue of being an 
involuntarily hospitalized peaon, diagnosed with a mental illness, was extensive. 
As Simmons points out: 
Once in hospital the patient was v h a l l y  a prisoner, with the 
superintendent granted "full control over the custody and care of the 
person of every patient" in the institution. This rneant that patients 
could be forcibly subjected to an array of drastic treatrnents such as 
insulin coma therapy, metrazol, electroshock, wet packs and even, as 
we have seen, psychosurgery. Patients could lose control of their 
property, they were stripped of their right to vote in provincial and 
federal elections, barred nom practicing as fimeral directors, police 
officers, accountants, medical doctors, pharmacists and they could be 
deported from the province or even canada? 
When some persons in the system began questioning the propriety of treating 
patients without any consent per se, many superintendents asked the Department of 
Health to require relatives to provide the supenntendents with "blanket consent for 
any treatment which may, in our judgrnent, be of benefit to the ~atient."~' Other 
superintendents asked permission of the Department of Health to send out consent 
forms to relatives of those patients who they wished to provide with various 
45Simmons, note 30 at 23. 
j6M. at 226. 
471bid. at 25. 
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treatments. The Department, and some psychiatrists, were not in favour of such a 
practice: "When any patient cornes to us for psychiatric treatment we should not be 
interfered with in giving adequate treatment by the withholding of consent by 
relative~."~~ 
There was no explicit reference to the treatment (voluntary or involuntary) of 
patients in psychiatric facilities in the statutes of Ontario until the Mental Hospitals 
qEt, 1 9 3 5 . ~ ~  S. 15 stated: 
Except as provided by this Act, the superintendent of an institution 
shall have full control over and the custody and care of the person of 
every patient in the institution and every patient shall be maintained, 
cared for, ma, released and discharged therefrom only as may 
be provided by this Act and the regulations. [emphasis added] 
Over time there were some transitions in the law regarding treatment, but the 
approach remained the same. The -0mpetencv Act, 1960'' applied in 
conjunction with the Men- Act regarding the care of persons who were 
incapable to consent to treatment. The M-etncv Act stated: 
2.--(1) Subject to The Mental Hospifals Act, the court 
has al1 the powers, jurisdiction and authority of Her Majesty 
over and in relation to the persons and estates of mentally 
48~imrnons, note 30 at 23, quoting Dr. Stevenson. 
49~.0. 1935, c. 39. 
5 0 ~ . ~ . 0 .  196 , c. 237. 
incompetent persons, including the care and the commitrnent 
of the custody of mentally incompetent persons and of their 
persons and estates. 
(2) The court may make orders for the custody of mentally 
incompetent persons and the management of their estates, 
and every such order takes effect, as to the custody of the 
person, imrnediately and, as to the custody of the estate, upon 
the completion of the cornmittee's security. R.S.O. 1950, 
c. 230, S. 2." 
When physicians became aware of the need for some type of authority or consent 
to treat individuals, many believed that the Public Hospitals ACP and its 1952 
regulations provided that authority." However, as H o h a n  points out: 
[n]ot only was the defmition of competency lacking but also there 
was not legal coverage at al1 for treatrnent in the community or for 
',-lncomwtenfv~ct, R.S.O. 1960, c. 237, S. 2 (1) and (2). 
53Brian F. Hofhan, to T r e n t  in On- (Toronto: 
Buttenvorihs, 1995) at 105 and Ontario, "Enquiry on Mental Competency: Final Report" 
(Chairman David N. Weisstub) (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1990) at 308. 0. Reg. 21 6/52, 
S. 43 stated: 
No surgical operation shall be perfonned on a patient unless a consent in 
writing for the performance of the operation has k e n  signed by the 
(a) patient, 
(b) spouse, one of the next of kin or parent of the patient if the patient 
is unable to by reason of mental or physical disability, or 
(c) parent or guardian of the patient if the patient is unmamed and 
under 18 years of age 
but if the surgeon believes that delay caused by obtaining consent would 
endanger the life of the patient 
(d) the consent shali not be necessary, and 
(e) the surgeon shall write and sign a statement that a delay would 
endanger the life of the patient. 
decisions about other areas of persona1 care; thus, in these laws, 
standards of competency or capacity assessments, guide-lines for 
substitute decisions, hierarchy of decision makers, rights or review 
and legal appeal were generally lacking." 
The Menal Ho*  AC^' of 1950 set out the powen of the superintendent of a 
psychiatric facility to inciude the 
full control over, and the custody and care of the person of every 
pr:icnt in the institution and every patient shall be maintained, cared 
for, treated in, released and discharged therefiom only as may be 
provided by this Act and the reg~lations.~~ 
However, the Mental Act. 1967~' spoke in more restrictive terrns and 
separated the areas of involuntary cornmitment from the need for treatment.'' . 
The criterion for involuntary cornmitta1 was narrowed to the dangerousness 
standards9 and there was no mention of "control over" or treatment as there was in 
the 1950 legislation. The change in legislation did not, however, result in a 
change in the practice of al1 psychiatrists treating patients without c ~ n s e n t . ~  
"Hoffman, note 53 at 105. 
55~.0 .  1950, c. 229. 
'%.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 14. 
"S.O. 1967, c. 51. 
58~ofsnan, note 53 at 106. 
60 Simmons, note 30 at 228-30. 
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With the increased movement to patient's rights that began in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the potential for persons with mental illness to have their civil rights violated was 
highlighted.6' The increased focus on rights in general resulted in incremental 
legislative acknowledgments of the rights of persons with mental illnesses to make 
decisions regarding accepting or refiising treatment. By 1980 the Ontario Mental 
Health  AC^^' acknowledged that capable patients had a right to refuse treatrned3 
and provided a mechanism for a person to appoint a substitute decision-maker to 
act on her competent wishes in the event of füture ui~apac i ty .~  The Act, however, 
also empowered a Review Board to override the wishes of an involuntary, 
treatment incapable patient who had made prior wishes while capable? 
6'The Canadian Civil Liberties Association cornmissioned two lawyers to review a 
sarnple of 200 involuntary certificates in the mid 1970s- They concluded that 
approximately "80% of the commitments were legally insufficient, lacking completeness, 
adequacy and noncircularity of evidence". See: Stewart Page "Cornmitment of the 
Mentally 111 in Ontario: The Last Two Decades" (1 994) l8:3 4 Legal Medical Quarterly 9. 
62v Act, R. S.O. 1980, c. 262. 
6 3 M e n t a l ,  R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. 3 5 (2) (a). 
" M e n t H e l t h  A ,  R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. lb. 
65~er&34-&& Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. 3Sa (4). This section was ruled 
unconstitutional in Fie- v. (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 74,82 D.L.R. (4") 298 (C.A.) 
(hereinafter ) which will be discussed fürther in Chapter 2. 
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IL Eedy Proccd~rs Uscd to Trmt Persans H a t b M c a t i l s e s  
As outlined above, in the years past, patients were involuntarily cornrnitted and 
treated without consent in Ontario. However, family members, persons fiom the 
general public, and even some professionals began to question the practice of the 
day. What was happening to these people? Did they need more protection? In 
order to understand why people became so concemed regarding the treatment of 
the mentally il1 in Ontario at that time, 1 will now provide a review of some of the 
treatments to which persons with mental illness were subjected. 
A) Sustained Sieep 
Persons with psychiatric illness, particularly those with psychotic or manic 
symptoms, were given dmgs to induce prolonged periods of sleep. Dr. Neil 
Macleod, a doctor fiom Scotland, placed a 50 year old woman expenencing 
delusions into a bromide-induced sleep that lasted over twelve days? Macleod 
treated other patients with prolonged sleep and claimed that, upon awakening, their 
illnesses had disappeared." 
(%horter, Edward, A b r y  of Ps v c b  (New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 
1997,) at 202. 
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Induced sleep by bromide administration was soon abandoned by other d~ctors,~'  
but the use of barbitunites to induce prolonged sleep was introduced. Some 
patients died following this p r o ~ e d u r e , ~ ~  but attempts to discover safer barbiturates 
continued. A particulary dark chapter in Canadian medical history surrounded the 
use of barbiturate-induced sleep by Dr. D. Ewen Cameron in Montreal. 
Dr. Cameron placed persons in a deep sleep and then performed other procedures 
upon them. 'O Although Dr. Cameron died "essentially in disgrace'"' in 1964, he 
had been a highly respected member of the psychiatrie cornmunity. He won 
several awards and had been a president of the American Psychiatric Association 
and the World Psychiatric ~ssociation? 
B) Insulin Coma 
The use of "Insulin Coma Therapy" began in Ontario on May 3 1, 1937 at the 
Toronto Psychiatric H ~ s p i t a l . ~ ~  It was described by a Department of Health 
68 Shorter, note 66 at 202. This treatment may have k e n  abandoned because 
of the nsk of bromide toxicity. 
69Lbid. at 205. Swiss psychiatrist Max Müeller determined that sleep induced 
treatment using the barbiturate Somnifen had a mortaiity rate of approximately 5%. 
section on "depatteming" on p. 26. 
"Shorter, note 66 at 207. 
"CBC, The Fifth Estate, Jan. 6, 1998. 
"Simmons, ylp~a note 30 at 16. 
OEcial as "...a unique experiment ... at present limited to fernale~".~' In the case of 
insulin coma therapy, patients were given large doses of insulin, a substance 
normally produced in the body in the pancreas to regulate sugars in the body. In 
psychiaûic facilities, persons with no physiological indication for treatment with 
insulin were given massive dosages of the dmg. Patients were in fact placed in an 
insulin coma, a condition that is today avoided at al1 costs in the treatment of 
persons with diabetes because of the profound dangers and harm done to the body 
by such a state. Afier being placed in an insulin coma, the patients were 
subsequently given glucose. Following a series of insulin-induced comas76 some 
of the patients had periods of lucidity for various durations." Dr. Peter Breggin, 
described his encounter with insulin shock during his training: 
75 Simrnons, note 30 at 16. It is disturbing to note that many of these very 
intrusive procedures were performed first, or disproportionally, upon women. In addition 
to the example of insulin coma cited above, electro-convuisive therapy was adrninistered 
much more frequently to women than to men. For example, in 1964, at Whitby 
Psychiatrie Hospital, 2,175 women were given ECT compared to 884 men (see 
Simmons, note 30 at 19/20). It is also disturbing that Dr. R. M. Bucke performed 
gyneco logical surgery on 209 women be fore abandonhg the practice, while on1 y wiring 
the foreskins of 15 men before ceasing that "treatment": see page 3 1-32 for more details 
regarding Dr. Bucke. Lobotomies were also performed on women far more fiequently 
thm on men (see note #105). While a full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, it shouid be noted that the disproportionate numbers of hamiful treatments 
inflicted on women is another example of the male-dominated discrimination women 
have endured in the past. 
'%orne patients were placed in insulin comas approxùnately 20 times, while in 
Nova Scotia in 1943, Dr. Charles Roberts increased his patients' insulin dosages over a 
penod of L O days that wouid result in a deep coma: See Shorter, note 66 at 2 12-2 13. 
1 observed the insulin coma room, where rows of patients were 
purposely overdosed with insulin, causing a &op in their blood 
sugar, until they fell into convulsions and a coma fiom starvation of 
the brain. As 1 watched them writhe about on mats, near death, it 
seemed like a scene fiom hell. 1 watched them being fed sugar and 
orange juice, to awaken into a state of fear and confûsion. The once 
difficult and unnily inmates with their brains now pemanently 
damaged, became gratefûlly dependent on their keepers after being 
brought back from the edge of death. Their righteous physicians 
called it an irnprovement and even a cure." 
C) Metrazol Therapy 
Metrazol is a camphor-based drug that was used beginning in the 1930s on penons 
in psychiatric h~spitals.'~ This dmg produced "spine-cracking convulsions"" 
which some claimed resulted in relief of some psychotic symptoms for some 
patients." Metrazol (and its successor Cardiazol) produced convulsions that 
resulted in a number of spinal fractures." In addition, the dnigs did not always 
produce the desired convulsions, and resulted in vomiting and muscular discornfort 
in the injection site post procedure." Many patients did not want to be injected 
78~eter R. Breggin Toxic Ps y&i&y (New York: St. Martin's Press, 199 1 ) at 6. 
79Simmons, note 30 at 15. 
"W. 
"Shorter, note 66 at 2 15-2 16. 
82Simrnons, y e ~ ô  note 30 at 19-20. 
83 Shorter, note 66 at 2 1 6. 
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with these drugs because of the severe feelings of dread and anxiety they 
expenenced prior to con~uls ing .~  In fact, one psychiatrist responsible for 
administering a camphor treatment in England recalled "...the unseemly and tragic 
farce of an unwilling patient being pursued by a posse of nurses with me, a fully 
loaded syringe in my hand, bringing up the rear."'' The introduction of 
electroconvulsive therapy resulted in the termination of camphor treatment~.~~ 
D) Laxatives 
"Administering laxatives to the mentally il1 on the assumption that toxins bottled 
up in the colon were making them insane, reached back to the Middle Ages and 
before."" The belief that cleansing the bowel with harsh laxatives could shorten 
an episode of mental illness continued until the 1920~.~* 
E) Forced Emetics 
Various drugs that produced violent vomiting were also used to treat persons with 
manic symptoms during the middle 19'" cenhiry: 
"Shorter, sucre note 66 at 2 16. 
8 6 E ~ ~  to be explained M e r :  see page 24. 
"Shorter, note 66 at 196. 
"81bid, 
...p atients who were bothered by mania and could not slow down 
were administered this drug [Apomorphine]. They were said to 
literally turn green and vomit for up to an hour. This would have a 
sapping effect and they would h a l l y  be able to get six hours or so of 
much needed r e ~ t . ~ ~  
F) Electroconvulsive Therapy 
Of al1 the treatments described above, electroconvulsive therapy, or ECT, is the 
only one still used in modem day psychiatry, although with much less fiequency, 
and with much different administration than in the past. ECT came into favour 
after experiments revealed that it was a much safer way to induce seizures than 
rnetrazol therapy. The risks of spinal fiacture were reducedTgO patients were more 
receptive to it than metrazol, and it was much cheaper and easier to adrnini~ter.~' 
The use of ECT as therapy for mental illness began in 194 1 in ~ntar io .~ '  As the 
g9Shorter, ylpra note 66 at 196. 
90 Simmons, note 30 at 19-20. Simrnons dso points out that the initial 
indications that ECT produced negligible instances of spinal fractures were dispelled by 
1950 when statistics revealed that between 1944 and 1950,12.8% of persons receiving 
ECT suffered compression fiactures of the spine. 
following statistics reveal, it rapidly gained popularity with psychiatrists: 
ber of ECT Performed in on tari^ 
It is unclear, even today, how ECT expressly works to alleviate some symptoms of 
mental illness, particularly depression." In the early days of administration in 
Ontario it was acknowledged that ECT served to subdue some violent patients and 
made caring for them much easier: a reference fkom the Archives of Ontario 
revealed that "[slhock therapy also greatly eased the nursing pr~blem".~' Dr. N. L. 
Easton, in 1946 advised the director of the hospitals division that he believed ECT 
should be used on the wards "...with the purpose of treating chronically disturbed 
patients-the nursing problem would be greatly alleviated and the destruction 
almost eliminated."% 
Electroconvulsive therapy is still performed today, particularly for treatment of 
93Simrnons, ylpia note 30 at 19-20. 
94Shorter, yllua note 66 at 207-8. 
95~immons, glpgl note 30 at 21. 
%Jbid. 
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major, irretractable depression. However, its use was sharply curtailed following 
the anti-psychiatry movement that began in the 1960s. 
G) bbDepatterning" 
Dr. Ewen Ca~ne ron ,~~  the renowned psychiatrist who practiced in Montreal, 
instituted a procedure he called "depatterning" with the aim of changing the 
person's previous b e h a v i o ~ r . ~ ~  To achieve this end he placed his patients in 
prolonged sleep and then attempted to erase and replace the images in theu minds. 
He did this by the use of continuous drug-induced sleep, ECT, and repeated taped 
messages. As noted earlier, Dr. Cameron died in 1964, "essentially in d i ~ ~ r a c e . " ~ ~  
Subsequently it has been revealed that Dr. Cameron was receiving fünds fiom both 
the CIA and the Canadian govemment to conduct these experiments regarding 
what we commonly refer to as brainwa~hing.'~~ 
H) Psychosurgery 
The concept of performing surgery on the brain to alleviate mental illness dates 
97 See section on "sustained sleep", p. 19. 
"Shorter, note 66 at 207. 
99 See p. 20. 
'%e legacy of  Dr. Cameron has been detailed in several different media, 
including the CBC Fiflh Estate television show of Jan. 6, 1998. 
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back to the Middle Ages when docton "fantasized about cutting for the mythical 
'stone of rnadne~s"'.'~' The most famous modem day re-creation of psychosurgery 
was portrayed in the film "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest." In this film, the 
lead character, refusing to adhere to hospital and societal noms, was 
Iobotomized. 
Psychosurgery refers to any surgery involving the brain. Lobotomies are 
procedures most commonly associated with attempts at psychiatrie treatment. 
Pre-fiontal lobotomies were perfomed either by drilling holes in the skull and 
inserting an instrument to sever the nerve pathways or by inserting an icepick 
through the eye socket and thin bone to reach the fiontal Surgical 
interference with the brain's fiontal lobes has far reaching consequences: 
The frontai lobes are the seat of higher human functions, such as 
love, concem for others, empathy, self-insight, creativity, initiative, 
autonomy, rationality, abstract reasoning, judgrnent, fùture planning, 
foresight, willpower, detemination, and concentration. The fiontal 
lobes allow us to be 'human' in the full sense of that word; they are 
required for a civilized, effective, mature life.'03 
Such procedures gained prominence in Ontario in the 1940s. The first lobotomy 
'OIShorter, a note 66 at 225. 
'O2= New Fmcv Britannic& 1997 ed., SN. "Lobotomy". 
1 O3 Breggin, note 78 at 53. 
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operations were performed in Ontario at the Toronto Psychiatric Hospital in 
1944' and were performed disproportionately on women. los in total, "p Jetween 
1944 and 1967 approximately 1,000 lobotomies were done at various provincial 
mental hospitais. An unknown number of operations were perfomed in general 
hospitals on patients admitted fiom the community and at the federally run 
Westminister Veteran's Hospital in London, Ontario. 9,106 
In the United States, Dr. Walter Freeman becarne the major promoter of 
lobotomies. He claimed to have performed 5,000 ~obotornies '~~ and travelled 
throughout the United States, Canada, Puerto Rico, and Curacao providing 
demonstrations of the proced~re.'~' His biographer relates that: 
[o]n one five-week summer trip that year, [195 11 he drove 1 1,000 
miles with a station wagon loaded, in addition to camping 
equipment, with an electroconvulsive shock box, a dictaphone, a file 
cabinet filled with patient records, photographs, and correspondence; 
1°<~arvey G. Simmons, "Psychosurgery and the Abuse of Psychiatric Authority in 
Ontario" (1987) 12:3 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 537 at 540. Dr. K.G. 
McKenzie, a neurosurgeon, perfomed the first operation. 
"'~he first 19 lobotomy operations in 1944 were ail performed on women. 
In addition, of the 150 lobotomies performed at Toronto General Hospital nom 
1948 to 1952, 109 were performed on women, while only 38 were conducted on 
men: see Simmons, note 104 at 540. 
'06Lbip. 
lo7Breggin, note 78 at 3 1. 
108 Shorter, note 66 at 227. 
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his surgical instruments were in his pocket.Iog 
Freeman's use of an unsterilized ice pick has been criticized, as has his technique: 
"...he sometimes showed off by stabbing the patient through both eye sockets at 
once with an ice pick in each hand.""O Although such practices are unthinkable 
today, Dr. Freeman was the Director of Neurology and Psychiatry at George 
Washington University in the District of Columbia and had been honoured with 
several awards. ' ' ' 
The excising of a portion of a person's fiontal lobe was done without any concrete 
evidence of benefit to the patient. It was soon acknowledged that the main benefit 
of performing lobotomies accrued to the nursing staff and the hospital 
administration: "[tlhe leucotomy program at this hospital has till recently been 
airned at alleviating the ward management problem with chronic, disturbed 
patients. Hence the great majority of our operated series is comprised of such 
7'112 cases. The response was similar at another hospital: 
Our first thought was to give lobotomies to the chronically 
'Ogshorter, note 66 at 227, citing Elliot Valenstein, Great D e s p m  
Cures, at 229. 
"'Breggin, note 78 at 32. 
"*Simmons, note 104 at 542, quoting Doig, 1957. 
assaultive, destructive and soiling group of patients that more or less 
regularly had to be secluded. Our thought was that we probably 
might not be able to get too many of these patients out of hospital, 
but we would create an easier nursing situation in the h~spital . ' '~ 
Not only were the nurses benefitted because of easier ward management, but 
psychiatrists were able to achieve sorne of the much desired recognition and 
respect accorded to their medical colleagues. By performing lobotomies, a 
surgical procedure, to treat mental illness, they were bringing their profession in 
line with medical practitioners: there was an "... enthusiastic reception to a medical, 
indeed a surgical, procedure which helped to blur the distinction between the 
practice of physical and psychiaeic medicine. 991 14 
Psychosurgery is not illegal today but is infiequently used in the treatment of 
psychiatric illness. The Ontario Mental Hedth Act1 l 5  States: 
S. 49. (1) Psychosurgery.--Psychosurgery shall not be administered to 
an involuntary patient, to a person who is incapable of giving or 
refùsing consent to psychosurgery on his or her own behalf for the 
purposes of the HeaZlh Core Consent Act, 1996, or to a person who 
is remanded or detained in a psychiatric facility punuant to the 
Criminal Code (Canada). 1987, c. 37, S. 1 1; 1992, c. 32, S. 20 (39); 
1996, c. 2, S. 72 (30). 
"3Simmons, note 104 at 542, quoting the superintendent of the Hamilton 
Hospital, December 15, 1958. 
(2) Same.--Psychosurgery is any procedure that, by direct or indirect 
access to the brain, removes, destroys or intempts the continuity of 
histologically normal brain tissue, or that inserts indwelling 
electrodes for pulsed electrical stimulation for the purpose of altering 
behaviour or treating psychiatrie illness, but does not include 
neurological procedures used to diagnose or treat organic brain 
conditions, intractable physical pain or epilepsy, if these conditions 
are clearly demonstrable. 1987, c. 37, S. 11; 1992, c. 32, S. 20 (39). 
I) Other Forms of Surgical Interve~tions 
In addition to the administration of medications, some psychiatrists, who believed 
that certain parts of the body had some connection to mental illness, performed 
surgical procedures in an attempt to sever this comection. This belief centered 
predominantly around the reproductive or sexual organs. Dr. Isaac Baker-Brown, 
a physician fiom Great Britain, performed clitoridectomies in an attempt to treat 
mental illness in women in the middle 1 9 ~  century.' l6 
In Ontario, Dr. Richard Bucke, superintendent of the London Psychiatrie Hospital, 
was also convinced that surgical intervention could alleviate mental illness. He 
believed that "insane mast~rbation""~ could be prevented by inserting a wire 
through a male patient's foreskin. After twenty-one operations Dr. Bucke 
concluded that this procedure was a failure and ceased performing it in 1877. He 
' %hortt, note 29 at 142. 
'''m. at 125. 
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was not convinced, however, that surgical intervention could not be beneficial. In 
1895 Dr. Bucke began performing gynecological surgery on women because he 
believed that the reproductive orgaos were linked to the brain."' Over a five year 
period Dr. Bucke perfonned various types of gynecological surgery on 209 
women, believing such surgery could alleviate mental illnrss . ' l9 Five patients 
died but Dr. Bucke reported a 64% rate of improvement: upon subsequent review 
of the doctor's records these claims have been said to be ~nsubstantiated."~ 
Conclusio~ 
Thus it can be seen that many abuses in the guise of therapy could be found in 
practice and the law with respect to comrnittal and involuntary treatment did little 
"*short& note 29 at 141-42. 
"9Jbid. at 143. Peter A. Rechnitzer, P . M a c k e  (Journev to Cosmiç 
o u s m  (Markharn: Associated Medical Services & Fitzhery & Whiteside, 1994) 









' 2 0 ~ h ~ m ,  note 29 at 148-49. 
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to prevent such abuses. The laws were reforrned and protective measures were put 
in place. However, there continues to be dissatisfaction with the current state of 
the law regarding involuntary hospitalization and treatment in Ontario. It is to a 
review of the current law regarding cornmitment and hvoluntary treatment in 
Ontario that 1 now tum. 
CHAPTER 2-CURRENT LEGAL REGIME 
Introductiop 
Legislation regarding psychiatric hospitalization and capacity to consent to 
treatment is found in Ontario in three main statutes: the Mental &alth Act,12' the 
. . 
Substihite D e ç ~ s ~ ~ a s  Act. 1 992 and the Health Care Consent Act. 1 996 '23. This 
set of iegislation is extensive, especially in cornparison to some other Canadian 
jurisdictions.'" In addition to being cornplex, Ontario's law regarding committal 
and treatment is in a considerable stage of flux: in the course of eight years, under 
two successive govemments, the legislation has been changed or arnended seven 
tirnes.l2' This arnount of change, in itself, may indicate the continued 
'"S. 0. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
"'For example, Nova Scotia does not have a separate Mentai Hedth Act, but 
combines general and psychiatric hospitals together in the Acly R. S.N.S. 1989, 
c. 208. 
'25Beginning in 199 1, under the former NDP government the following changes 
were made: 
(1) to Trea- Act. 1992. S.O. 1992, c. 3 1 proclaimed 
(2)  te Dec- Act. 1 992 
. . S.O. 1992, c. 30 proclaimed 
(3) &iv_oçacv Act. 1 992, S.O. 1992, c. 26 proclaimed 
(4) Consent md C i e i t v  S m t e  Law Act, S.O. 1992, c.32 
proclairned. 
Following much cnticism of the above legislation, especially regarding the complexity 
and difficulty of implementing the requirements in clinical practice, the Progressive 
Conservative govemment made sweeping changes: 
(a) Agivocacy Act. 1 992 was repealed in 1 995; 
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dissatisfaction that many persons in Ontario feel regarding this area of the law. It 
also may poignantly reflect the difficulty that the law has in addressing complex 
issues surrounding civil rights, health care concems, and societal expectations. 
Since the law regarding psychiatric hospitalization and capacity to consent to 
treatment is so complex in Ontario, 1 will review it in depth here. To begin, 1 will 
set out the current legislation regarding psychiatnc hospitalization of voluntary 
patients, detainees, and involuntary patients. 1 will then review the case law 
pertaining to hospitalization. Sections of the legislation that have been 
misinterpreted or misapplied by health care professionals, the public, patients and 
even boards of review will be pariicularly highlighted. The common law 
principles regarding restraint will also be reviewed. 
Next, I will consider the status of the law regarding treatment. The current 
legislation pertaining to treatment will be set out, foliowed by a review of the case 
law in this area. The cornmon law regarding treatment will also be highlighted. 
(b) -nt to T r e w  Act. 1992 was repeaied in 1996; 
(c) -th Gate CO- Act. 199& S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. was proclaimed 
into force on March 29, 1996. 
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Finally, 1 will explore issues that arise at the intersection of comrnittal and 
treatment. The following scenarios will be specifically reviewed: ïnvoluntary and 
incapable patients; involuntary and capable patients; voluntary and capable 
patients; and, voluntary and incapable patients. Through this exploration the 
dilemma driving this thesis will corne into focus: how is the situation of a 
voluntary, treatment incapable patient, who refuses to take medications orally or 
to comply with treatments that have been approved by his substitute decision- 
maker, to be addressed? 
1. - 
A) The Ment- ~ c t ~ ~ ~  
a) Voluntary Patients 
There are three ways in which a person may become a voluntary patient in a 
psychiatric facility. First, a person may be admitted directly as a voluntary patient 
as envisioned by S. 12 of the Mental He&  AC^.'^' Second, a penon may become 
a voluntary patient afier an application for psychiatric assessrnent has been 
'"R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 12 states: 
Admission of informal or voluntary patients. -Any person who is 
believed to be in need of the observation, care and treatment provided in a 
psychiatric facility may be adrnitted thereto as an informal or voluntary 
patient upon the recommendation of a physician. R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. 
8; 1986, c. 64, S. 33 (5). 
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completed, but the criteria for involuntary admission have not been made out."' 
Third, an involuntary certificate may 1 a p ~ e . I ~ ~  
There is no definition of a voluntary patient in the Mental Health Act. However, 
an Ontario Psychiatrie Review Board,"' in a discussion of the meaning of the term, 
has mied that "...the terni clearly connotes a situation wherein the individual bas 
the opportunity to exercise his or her own fkee will. ~ ~ 1 3 1  
"'R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 20 (1) (b) states: 
Duty of attending physician.-?he attending physician, after observing 
and exarnining a person who is the subject of an application for 
assessrnent under section 15 or who is the subject of an order under 
section 32, 
........*..........................................*........*...................*-.....*..... 
(b) shall admit the person as an informai patient or voluntary patient if the 
attending physician is of the opinion that the person is suffering tiom 
mental disorder of such a nature or quality that the person is in need of the 
treatment provided in a psychiatrie facility and is suitable for admission as 
an informai or voluntary patient;.. . 
'"R.S.0. 1990, c. M.7, S. 20 (6) states: 
Change of status, where period of detention has expiredo--An 
involuntary patient whose authorized period of detention has expired shall 
be deemed to be an iaformal or voluntary patient. R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. 
14 (6); 1986, c. 64,s. 33 (1 6), part. 
13% s review body is now titled the Consent and Capacity Board. 
'"Re J.GL (November 1 1, 1993, unreported). See H y  Bloom and Michael Bay, A 
Practical Guide to M m  He* C m d  Coflsent 1- (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1996) at 122. 
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A voluntary patient is one who rnay be discharged fiom a facility on request."' 
Indeed, as stated in S. 14 of the Mental H e w  AC^:'^' 
[nlothing in this Act authorizes a psychiatnc facility to detain or 
restrain an informal or voluntary patient. 
The authority to restrain or detain a voluntary patient, if it is to be found, must be 
. . 
located in either the S _ u b s t i t u I w n s  Act. 1992'" or the Health Care Consent 
Act. 1 996.135 
b) Detainees and Involuntary Patients 
Persons rnay be brought into a psychiatrie hospital against their will by means of 
an Application for Psychiatrie Assessment (commonly referred to as an %PA" or 
"Fom 1 ").136 While such persons are commonly referred to as involuntary 
'j2- R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 14. It should be noted that voluntary 
patients rnay not be as fiee to leave a facility as perhaps thought. Some hospitals require 
that al1 persons see a physician prior to discharge. This, at the very least, implies a delay 
in deparhue. Furthemore, if the physician believes that the patient should remain 
hospitalized and if the patient is unwilling to do so voluntarily, the patient rnay be 
certified as an involuntary patient if they meet the cntena. Thus seeking to leave, as a 
voluntary patient, rnay trigger involuntary committal. 
"3.0. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
addition to physicians, Justices of the Peace and Peace Officers are given 
powers under the Heath Act to detain any person they suspect is sufXering from a 
mental iIlness and rnay cause senous h m  to themselves, harm to someone else or is 
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patients, such a designation is incorrect: such persons are not patients, but 
detainees. 13' 
S. 15 (1) of the Meml He& Act 13* States: 
Where a physician examines a person and has reasonable cause to 
believe that the person, 
(a) has threatened or attempted or is threatening or 
attempting to cause bodily h m  to himself or herself; 
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person 
or has caused or is causing another person to fear bodily harm 
fiom him or her; or 
(c) has shown or is showing a lack of cornpetence to care for 
himself or herse1 f, 
and if in addition the physician is of the opinion that the person is 
apparently suffering firom mental disorder of a nature or quality that 
likely will result in, 
(d) serious bodily harm to the person; 
(e) serious bodily h m  to another person; or 
(f) imminent and serious physical impairment of the person, 
the physician may make application in the prescribed form for a 
psychiatric assessment of the person. 
The overt criteria or behaviours necessary for a physician to issue an APA are 
exhibiting an inability to care for him or herself: see S. 16 regarding the powers of an 
order of a Justice of the Peace, and S. 17 in relation to the authority of police officers. It 
should be noted that the authority of the Justice of the Peace and police officers extends 
only to authorising or bringing the person before a physician for examination (see S. 16 
(3) and S. 17), not for the 72 h o u  assessment. An examination by a physician consists of 
an interview and observation of the patient, typically lasting fiom several minutes (if the 
patient is very disturbed and/or cannot provide much information) to a few hours. The 72 
hour assessment takes place at a psychiatric facility. 
'37& v. W e b e ~  (1994), 95 C.C.C. (3d) 334 at 347 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) 
(hereinafter Webers). See also Bioom and Bay, ~ypra  note 13 1 at 123. 
40 
quite broad: they include past behaviour (e.g. "has threatened"), present behaviour 
(e.g. "is threatening") and another person's fear of potential behaviour (e-g. "is 
causing another person to fear bodily harm fiom him or her"). However, not only 
must the ps t ,  present or potential behaviour criteria be met, the physician must 
also believe that the person has a mental disorder that will result in serious bodily 
harm to himself, to another, or "imminent and serious physical impairment of the 
Y Y  139 person . 
An APA is sufficient authority for anyone to deliver the narned person to a 
psychiatric facility.l4' Once there, a person may be detained for psychiatric 
examination for 72 hours. 14' 
An involuntary patient is defmed under the M e n t a l   AC^'^^ as ".-.a person 
who is detained in a psychiatric facility under a certificate of involuntary 
Y? 143 admission or a certificate of renewal . A certificate of involuntary admission 
may be filled out by a physician after exarnining a detainee in hospital under the 
13%4en- Act R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 7, S. 1 S. 
R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 7, S. 15 (a). 
' ' " M e n e & h  Act R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 15 (b). 
'j2R.S.0. 1990, c. M.7. 
"'R.s.0. 1990, c. M.7, S. 1. 
authority of S. 15 (application for psychiatric assessment), or at any time a 
voluntary patient meets the critena set out in S. 20 (5): 
Conditions precedent to making of certificate of involuntary 
admission or certificate of renewa1.--The attending physician shall 
not complete a certificate of involuntary admission or a certificate of 
renewal unless, after he or she has examined the patient, he or she is 
of the opinion both, 
(a) that the patient is suffering fiom mental disorder of a 
nature or quality that likely will result in, 
(i) serious bodily harm to the patient, 
(ii) serious bodily ham to another person, or 
(iii) imminent and serious physical impairment of the 
patient, 
unless the patient remains in the custody of a psychiatric 
facility; and 
(b) that the patient is not suitable for admission or continuation as 
an informai or voluntary patient. 
The physician must believe that the person has a mental illness and that such 
illness will likely result in serious bodily h m  io that person or someone else, or 
imminent and serious impairment of that penon. 
A certificate of involuntary admission is sufficient authority to detain a person in a 
psychiatric facility for a maximum of two w e e k ~ . ' ~ ~  Certificates of renewal are 
issued subsequent to certificates of involuntary admission and may authonze 
holding a peaon involuntarily for periods of one, two or three additional 
'"Me- A& R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 20 (4) (a). 
An involuntarily cornmitted person, or her representative, may make an application 
to the Consent and Capacity Board to challenge her involuntary status. '46 A 
decision of the Board may be appealed to the Ontario Court (General Division) on 
a question of law or fact or b~th . '~ '  
The legislation regarding detainees and involuntary patients has been considered in 
several cases. In particular, the necessity of the commission of an act before 
certification can be initiated, the connection that must exist between the mental 
disorder and the risk of h m ,  and the standard of proof required to be met to 
justiQ involuntary commitment have al1 been the subject of judicial interpretation. 
In addition, there has been much judicial consideration of the meaning of different 
terms or phrases contained in the legislation. For instance, the phrase "likely will 
'45pvientpd Hedth Act, R.S.O., c. M.7, S. 20 (4) (b) (i), S. 20 (4) (b) (ii), S. 20 (4) (b) 
(iii). As long as a patient rneets the criteria for involuntary committal, subsequent 
certificates of renewal may be completed by the physician: that is, renewal upon renewal 
may be completed. The longest period a person may be held on one renewal certificate, 
without the completion of a subsequent renewal, is three months. Once a person 
becomes voluntary, in the event of subsequent need for certification, the same process 
and time h e s  that applied for the initiai involuntary certificate would pertain. 
'46M He-, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 39 (1). Note: the Consent and 
Capacity Review Board is the new name for the previous Psychiatric Review Board in 
Ontario. 
"'Mental, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 48 (1). 
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result in" in relation to the probability of the patient becoming a danger to himself, 
others, or exhibiting an inability to care for hirnself, the meaning of "serious 
physical impairment of the person," and "imminent" have al1 received judicial 
scrutiny. The following section will review the case law in Ontario that has 
considered the issues listcd above. 
i) persons may be detained for examination under S. 15 or held 
involuntarily pursuant to S. 20 absent an overt act (e.g. violence to self 
or others) 
In S t a m  v. Pene-ne -th the Ontario Court 
(General Division) stated that the "Mental Health Act doesn't require proof of 
commission of an 'overt act. ,99149 There, a man diagnosed as a pedophile with a 
"history of repeated incest, sexual coercion and premeditation in his off en ce^"'^^ 
challenged his involuntary detention. Although he had not engaged in such 
behaviour for some time, the Court held that an overt act was not a necessary 
precondition for continued detention as an involuntary patient. Judge O'Driscoll 
'48[1994] O.J. No. 1958 (Q.L.) ( hereinafter m). 
149w at para. 36. 
lS0@j& at para. 22. 
44 
cited both Dav- v. and Mc- v. 0 '~oh- '"  in support of this 
principle. 
Similarly, the Ontario District Court in v. ~ ' ~ o h e r & " ~  upheld a review 
board's decision that a woman's involuntary detention was legal even though no 
overt action had transpired. The woman had a history of paranoid schizophrenia 
and believed that other people were impersonating and following her. While a 
student in a Law and Security course she went to the coilege and threatened to 
retum and shoot 22 people she had piaced on a "hit list" if she was not allowed to 
graduate from her program and join the R.C.M.P.. In relation to the appellant's 
counsel's position that his client was detained unlawfully because she had never 
carried through w ith her threats, the Court replied: 
Neither S. 9 [now S. 151 nor S. 14 [now S. 201 of the Mental Health 
Act requires an overt act or commission before an involuntary 
comrnittal cm be made. In this case there was a preponderance of 
evidence of great cogency that the mental disorder of the appellant 
had deteriorated to the point where her delusions were begiming to 
ovenvhelm her, and she was acting out of control.'" 
"'(1987), 62 O.R. ( 2 4  588 at 598 @ist. Ct.) (hereinafter M). 
"*[1989] 0.1. NO. 965 @kt. Ct.) (Q.L.) (hereinafter M f ) .  
'53Jbidt See also Richard D. Schneider, ne 1996 Aniiptated Ontgno Mental 
Health Statutes (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 1 1 .  
'%-, note 152 at 19-20. 
Citing M ~ , 1 5 5  Judge Bolan of the Ontario Court (General Division) overtumed 
a finding of a review board in v. ~ d a m s . ' ~ ~  In îhis case, a penon 
involuntarily detained at a psychiatric hospital had a knife in her possession and 
had threatened bodily harm to members of the nursing staff. Judge Bolan stated: 
In finding that the evidence fell short of establishing a likelihood of 
danger to anyone, the Board referred to the fact that not a shred of 
evidence indicated that Middel ever carried out any of the threats she 
ever made. This is clearly an error in law. 
.---..-...................................................................*............... m.........-.. 
It suffices to show that there is a likelihood of such an event 
0cc-g . Dr. Adams came to this conclusion based on evidence of 
past threats as well as the nature of the mental disorder it~elf.'~' 
Health professionals are often unaware that there does not need to be an overt act 
of violence or danger for a person to be subject to the detaining provisions of the 
Mental Health Act. A comrnon misconception is "1 can't certifL him because he 
hasn't hurt anybody yet." However, this is an emor in law. 
. - 
' S 5 . M c w ,  note 152 at 19-20. 
Is6[l 9931, OJ. NO. 2864 (C.J. (Gen. Div.)) (Q.L.) (hereinafter M i d u ) .  
15f&idt at para. 7. 
ii) "likely wW resuit inn158 
Section 20 of the Act stipulates that the person must have a mental illness that 
"likely will result in" serious bodily h m  to self, others, or imminent and serious 
physical impairment to the person. "Likely" has been defined as "Flaving an 
appearance of truth or fact; that looks as if it would happen, be realized or proved 
to be what is alleged or suggested. ~robable.""~ Therefore, as Bloom and Bay 
point out: 
The does not require that an attending physician be certain 
that a particular h m  will occur before the physician admits or 
continues a patient as an involuntary patient. Rather, the Act 
requires that the attending physician form an opinion about whether 
or not, as a result of mental disorder, one or more of the harms listed 
in S. 20 (5) is likely to occur unless the patient remains in the custody 
of a psychiatrie facility .... In c o n s i d e ~ g  whether or not hann is 
"1 ikel y", the courts have held that "likely" means "probable", not 
"highly probable. 3, 160 
iii) "serious physical impairment of the p e r ~ o n " ' ~ '  
Persons with mental illness can experience impairment due to their condition that 
seriously affects their ability to care for themselves. "This ground contemplates 
1 5 8 M e x @ J 4 J  Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, ss. 15 (1) (f) and 20 (5) (a) (iii). 
"'m v. Anderson (June 28, 1 98S), Doc. No. Toronto 609/85 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) 
(hereinafter m). Cited with approval in M m  note 152 at 19. 
'MBloom and Bay, note 13 1 at 127, citïng note 159. 
I6'In S. 15 (1) (f) and S. 20 (5) (iii) of the Mental Hedth Act. 
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the situation where a person's mental disorder interferes in such a substantial way 
with his or her abilities to provide for at least minimal bodily needs that the person 
is at serious r i ~ k . ' " ~ ~  In F o r a  v. Q ' ~ o h e r t v l ~ ~  Judge Fitzgerald indicated that Mr. 
Foran should remain in hospital as he accepted that without such care he would 
"take up his aimless and slovenly existence which would ultimately lead to 
physical deteri~ration."'~~ However, he overtumed the review board's decision to 
confimi the involuntary certificate because there was not convincing evidence that 
his discharge would result in "imminent and serious physical impairment." 
The resulting physical impairment must be serious. In v. Judge 
Brown accepted that serious bodily h m  "must be more than trifling" as 
recognized in v. McEw_ain? Judge Brown cautioned that: 
[tlhere may, for example, be many persons with mental disorden 
who may, in response to the mental disorder be a nuisance to 
themselves a d o r  others but their behaviour may fa11 far short of 
there being a likelihood of serious bodily harm or harm beyond a 
mere trifling nature. 16' 
'"Bloom and Bay, sup~â note 1 3 1 at 87. 
'"[L986], O.J. No. 2146 ( Dist. Ct.) (Q.L.) (hereinafier m). 
'"~bid. at 4-5. 
165[1993], O.J. No. 1261 ( Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (Q.L.) (hereinafter u). 
' 6 6 ~ ,  note 15 1. 
' 6 7 T r ~ ,  sypia note 165 at para. 9. 
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It has also been recognized that a person may be so disordered that his conduct 
may make him the target of h m  by others. InJ,evinskas v. ~ u t s o n l ~ ~  the Court 
ruled that such a risk would be grounds to hold a person under the "imminent and 
senous physical impairment of the person" cnteria of the &.'" 
iv) 66imminent"'70 
The requirement of imminence oniy applies to the risk of serious physical 
impairment of the person."' Therefore, the possibility that a person may harm 
himself or others does not have to "imminenty' in order for involuntary certification 
to occur. The term "imminent9'in relation to senous physical impairment of the 
person has been broadly interpreted by the c o u d R  in most, but not all, instances. 
In G. (G.1 v. the Ontario District Court affirmed a Board of Review 
decision that ruled that imminent and serious physical impairment could result if a 
168(1989), 16 AC. W.S. (3d) 143 (Ont. Dist. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (hereinafler 
Levinskas). 
'69m. See also Bloom and Bay, note 13 1 at 87. 
'"ln S. 1 5 (1 ) (f) and S. 20 (5) (iii) of the Mental H e m  Act. 
I7'As Michael Bay points out, contrary to the "Toronto Star version of the Mental 
Health Act", imminent only applies to physical impairment: see Bay, note 16 at 
125. 
'"~loorn and Bay, note 13 1 at 138. 
' n ( ~ p n l  4, 1986), Doc. No. Thunder Bay 1 179186 (Ont. Dist. Ct.). 
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patient was discharged with a history of medication noncornpliance. Should this 
person not take her medications, she would deteriorate within "a matter of 
w e e k ~ . " ' ~ ~  The Court held that this time fiame was suficient to satisfy the meaning 
of "imminent. 9'175 
Similarly, in v. o ' D o ~ ~ ' "  the Court held that a person with delusions 
that interfered with her understanding of her medical condition, and a history of 
increased weight and salt intake that greatly increased her chance of having a 
stroke, satisfied the criteria for "imminent and serious physical impairment". 
Absent continued hospitalization, the court ruled that the patient was at risk of 
suffering a stroke. 
As Bloom and Bay point out: 
A refùsal to take prescribed medication or a history of non- 
cornpliance with treatment may place a patient at risk of imminent 
and serious physical impairment, particularly where the patient has a 
history of decompensating w i ~  about a -th of disch- fiom a 
psychiatric facility and thereafter being at risk of senous physical 
175Note that the Court listed as reasons for this person's probable futw 
decompensation non-cornpliance with medications and an "apparent lack of community 
resources". As will be discussed m e r ,  it is highly controversial that persons may be 
denied their liberty as a resdt of fiscal restraint or administrative inaction. 
'76(~pril  14, l986), DOC. NO. l226/86 (Ont. Dist. Ct.). 
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impairment. 177[ernphasis added] 
However, the Ontario District Court bas also held that a failure to take prescribed 
medications following discharge that would likely lead the person to "...take up his 
aimless and slovenly existence which would lead to physical 
deterioration" is not sufficient to satisfy the legislative mandate for "$nmi=and 
serious physical impairment".178 Judge Fitzgerald stated: 
1 have challenged the respondent to show me in the evidence what 
specific imminent and serious harm will likely result from this 
patient's release beyond some f b t ~  conjectural possibility. He is 
unable to do ~ 0 . l ' ~  [emphasis added] 
The Judge then "regretfully''180 held that the Board of Review had erred in its 
decision and rescinded the involuntary certificate. 
v) necessary connection between the mental disorder and the risk of 
harmI8' 
Sections 15 (1) and 20 (5) are both clearly drafted to indicate that not only must 
there be a risk of ham to self, harm to others, or a lack of cornpetence to care for 
- - 
in Bloom and Bay, note 1 3 1 at 138. 
178m SYPC~ note 163. 
'79m at 7.
ls0Jbid. at 8. 
'"Bloom and Bay, note 13 1 at 128. 
S t  
self, but this nsk must be present as a result of a m w o r d x .  "Mental 
disorder" is defined broadly in the Mental H e m ' 8 2  as "any disease or 
disability of the rnind".lg3 As the couris in I (1ek  v. '" v. 
H ~ t s o n ' ~ ~  and u c e a  
. . i v. mls6 have held, there must be a comection between 
the disease and the outcome of harm to self or others, or the lack of cornpetence to 
care for self. 
In Diilanceai v. mls7 Judge Perras of the Ontario District Court held that simply 
because a person with a mental illness had no money, no source of fun&, no place 
to stay, and no clear plans for his fuhue was not justification for certification. He 
stated: 
... under the present law, it does not appear that any review board can 
justify confirming a certificate of involuntary admission on the basis 
of a fmding of that kind. The cause that will likely result in the 
imminent and senous physical impairment of the patient needs to be 
related to the mental disorder suffered by the patient. It is not 
enough that the impairment might result from a lack of fùnds or of a 
"*R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7. 
Ig3S. 1 .  
lM[1984] O.J. No. 1540 @ist. Ct.) (Q.L.) (hereinafter w) . 
laSm note 168. 
'"[1988] 0 . J .  No. 1079 (Dist. Ct.) (Q.L.) (hereinafter m). 
'87w 
place to live."' 
vi) standard of proof required for civil commitment 
Because of the civil nature of commitment, it has been held that the standard of 
proof required in circumstances of civil cornmitment is a balance of 
probabili ties. ' 89 However, because of the deprivation of liberty involved, 'ihere 
must be clear and cornpelling evidence to support a patient's involuntary detention 
97 1 9 0  in a psychiatric facility . In addition, the trier of fact may submit such evidence 
to a higher degree of ~crutiny. '~' 
B) ealth Care Consent Act. 1996192 
There are three potential penons who may have authority to consent to the 
admission of an incapable person to a psychiatric facility: a guardian, a penon 
appointed through a power of attorney for persona1 care, and a substitute decision- 
d, note 186 at 14. 
lg9See Cieppor v. piv a, [1992] B.C. J. No. 694 (S.C.) (Q.L.); 
,m., note 152;  note 159; GAG.) v. Swaniy, yipca note 173; 
Diilanceai ylp~a note 186; Davk ,  ~ ~ e ç ô  note 15 1. 
'90~loom and Bay, note 13 1, citing G. fGJ v. S w w ,  note 173 and 
McKay, sripra note 1 52. See also Enrpn, yipra note 1 63 at 8 and m, note 1 65 at 
paragraph 7. 
I9'JvlcIQy,  SUD^^ note 152 at 18. 
'92S.0. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
rnal~er.''~ First, under the authority of this Act, a guardian appointed after an 
application has been made to the court through the procedure outlined in the 
Substitute thwms Act 1992 
. . 
'94 may have the authority to consent to an incapable 
person's admission to a psychiatric fa~i1ity.I~~ Section 24 states: 
(2) Objection, psychiatric facilitp- If the incapable person is 16 
years old or older and objects to being admitted to a psychiatric 
facility for treatment of a mental disorder, consent to his or her 
admission may be given only by, 
(a) his or her guardian of the person, if the guardian has authority 
to consent to the admission1% 
Second, a person who has been granted the incapable penon's power of attorney 
may have the power to consent to the incapable person's admission to a psychiatric 
facility, over his or her objection. This power would only exist if the authonty to 
give such consent was explicitly contained in the power of attorney.'" Such 
' 9 3 ~  substitute decision-maker is essentially any one who makes a decision on 
behalf of another. While guardians and persons who have been appointed by another in a 
Power of Attorney for Personal Care are substitute decision-makers, the tenn, used in this 
section relates to persons who have not been given explicit authority through a Court 
Order or POAPC but have been called upon to make a decision for another. 
' 9 S ~  guardian may be full or partial and have differing authority: this will be 
explained M e r  in the following section on the Substitute D e v s  Act. 1 992 . . . 
' % H e a l t h b ~ o n s e n t  Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 24 (2) (a). 
l9'&&h Care C-t Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 24 (2) (b) states: 
Objection, psychiatric faci1ity.--If the incapable person is 16 years old or 
older and objects to king admitted to a psychiatric facility for treatment of 
a mental disorder, consent to his or her admission rnay be given only by, 
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Powers of Attorney are often referred to as Ullysses con tract^.'^^ If the authority 
was not provided in the power of attomey, the person narnedàs the attorney for 
persona1 care decisions could not consent to the admission over the incapable 
person's objections. 
Finally, a substitute decision-maker may authorize the admission of an incapable 
person to a psychiatric facility if the incapable person, who is over 16, does not 
refuse admission for the purpose of treatment. Sections 24 (1) and (2) of the Act 
state: 
(1) Admission to hospital, etc.--Subject to subsection (2), a 
substitute decision-maker who consents to a treatment on an 
incapable person's behalf may consent to the incapable person's 
admission to a hospital or psychiatric facility or to another health 
facility prescribed by the regulations, for the purpose of the 
treatment. 
(2) Objection, psychiatric faci1ity.--If the incapable person is 16 
years old or older and objects to beïng admitted to a psychiatric 
facility for treatment of a mental disorder, consent to his or her 
admission may be given only by, 
(a) his or her guardian of the person, if the guardian has authonty 
@) his or her attorney for personal are, if the power of attorney 
contains a provision authonpng the attorney to use force that is 
necessary and reasonable in the circumstances to admit the 
incapable person to the psychiatric facility and the provision is 
effective under subsection 50 (1) of the -ans Act. . . 
1992. 
Ig8See Chapter 2, p. 75-76 
to consent to the admission; or 
(b) his or her attorney for persona1 care, if the power of attorney 
contains a provision authoriziag the attorney to use force that 
is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances to admit the 
incapable person to the psychiatrïc facility and the provision 
is effective under subsection 50 (1) of the Substitute 
Decisions Act, 1992. 
The H H  does acknowledge another situation wherein a 
person may be restrained or confined: section 7 of the States: 
Restraint, confinement.--This Act does not affect the comrnon law 
duty of a caregiver to restrain or confme a person when irnmediate 
action is necessary to prevent serious bodily h m  to the person or to 
oîhers. 
Therefore, should a patient act out towards himself or another, the members of the 
health care team would be justified, and in fact, would have a &&y to use physical 
or manual restraint, or to confme the person. 
At cornmon law a person "...may use force to rescue a person, even a stranger, 
from atta~k.'"~' A similar p ~ c i p l e  has been codified in the Çnminal Code . . in S. 
37: 
(1) Every one is justified in using force to defend himself or any 
one under his protection fiom assault, if he uses no more 
force than is necessary to prevent the assault or the repetition 
of it. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to justifL the wilîùl 
infliction of any hurt or mischief that is excessive, having 
lWWe&, note 137. 
regard to the nature of the assault that the force used was 
intended to prevent?' 
Therefore, a caregiver would be justified in restraining a patient in order to protect 
other patients, or themselves nom suffering injuries. This justification could be 
seen to be as a result of the relationship of the caregiver to the patient, or because 
the patient could be characterized as a person under his or her protection. 
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1978 that a hospital had a duty to protect its 
patients fkom the forseeable violent acts of a psychiatric patient.20' In Lawsoa v. 
Welleslev Hospital the Court stated: 
It was not doubted by counsel for the parties that at common law a 
hospital, especially one providing treatment for mentally-il1 persons, 
would be under a common law liability if by reason of its failure to 
provide adequate control and supervision injury occurred to third 
parties by reason of the conduct or behaviour of a patient.'02 
The situation of restraining a patient to prevent them fiom self harm is not as clear. 
Cornmon sense dictates that if a person is an inpatient at a psychiatric facility and 
he attempts to kill or h m  himself, the staff will be justified, and most would Say, 
Io' ~ a w s o n  v. Welleslev H o a  (1 978), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 688 (hereinafter Lawson). 
* O 2 M  at 691. See also v. -e L t d  [1986] 4 W.W.R. 559 (Sask. 
Q.B.) where a patient with a history of violence struck another patient and the facility was 
held liable for failing to ensure the safety of the resident. 
required to prevent this nom occuming. The person would certainly then meet the 
criteria for forma1 committal. As one author has put it: 
[wlhen the threat posed by the mentally incapable person is a threat 
only to himself, the courts will likely infer the consent of the relevant 
person (the substitute consent-giver) to the imposition of restraints; 
or, to achieve the same sensible end, will press into service the so- 
called emergency doctrine.203 
However, it should be noted that this common law authority to restrain and detain 
exists only in response to the possibility of the patient becoming a danger to 
himself or others: that is, a psychiatric emergency situation. It cannot be used as 
justification to restrain or detain a voluntary patient who is resisting treatment. In 
particular, it is this author's belief that for the time the voluntary, treatment 
incapable person who is resisting treatment, is physically restrained in order to be 
involuntarily treated, she has been detained. This common law exception cannot 
be used as authority for such an action. 
c) Su bstitute Decisions Act. 1992 . . 204 
The Substitute Decislpgis Act. 1992 . . is concemed with mainly two types of 
persons who may make decisions on behalf of another: a guardian and a person 
'03~arney Sneiderman, John C .  IrWie and Philip H. Osborne, (Canadian Medicd 
Law (Toronto: CarsweH, 1995) at 162. 
acting under the authority of a power of attorney. A guardian of a personzo5must 
be court appointed. Section 55 states: 
(1) Application for appointment.--The court may, on any person's 
application, appoint a guardian of the person for a person who is 
incapable of personal care and, as a result, needs decisions to be 
made on his or her behalf by a person who is authorized to do so. 
(2) Prohibition.--The court shall not appoint a guardian if it is 
satisfied that the need for decisions to be made will be met by an 
alternative course of action that, 
(a) does not require the court to fmd the person to be 
incapable of personal care; and 
(b) is less restrictive of the person's decision-making 
rights than the appointment of a guardiado6 
A court may grant either full or partial g~ardianship.~~' Full guardianship could be 
ordered if the person was found incapable of making personal care decisions in al1 
of the areas outlined in S. 45 of the Act which states: 
Incapacity for persoaal care.--A person is incapable of persona1 
care if the person is not able to understand information that is 
relevant to making a decision concerning his or her own health care, 
nutrition, shelter, clothing, hygiene or safety, or is not able to 
appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or 
lack of deci~ion.~ '~ 
. . ecisiow Act. 1 992 also makes provisions for guardians of property : 
see ss 15, 16, and 22. 
206 . . Substitute De-2, S.O. 1992, c. 30. 
. 
e w  Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, ss. 59 and 60. 
. . 
e- Act. 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30. 
The authority of a person who has been granted full guardianship of another in 
respect of personal care is quite extensive. Section 59 (2) and (3) set out those 
powers. 209 A guardian with full authority may consent to an incapable person's 
admission to a psychiatrie facility for the purposes of treatment, even over the 
'09S. 59 (2) and (3) state: 
(2) Powers of guardiam-Under an order for full guardianship, the 
guardian may, 
exercise custodial power over the person under 
guardianship, determine his or her living arrangements and 
provide for his or her shelter and safety; 
be the person's litigation guardian, except in respect of 
litigation that relates to the person's property or to the 
guardian's status or powers; 
settle claims and commence and settle proceedings on the 
person's behalf, except claims and proceedings that relate 
to the person's property or to the guardian's status or 
powers; 
have access to personal information, including health 
information and the release of that information to another 
person, except for the purposes of litigation that relates to 
the person's property or to the guardian's status or powers; 
on behalf of the person, make any decision to which the 
Health Cure Consent Act, 1996 applies; 
make decisions about the person's health care, nutrition and 
hygiene 
make decisions about the person's employment, education, 
training, clothing and recreation and about any social 
services provided to the person; and 
exercise the other powers and perform the other duties that 
are specified in the order. 1996, c. 2, S. 37 (1). 
(3) Power to apprehend person.--If the guardian has custodial power 
over the person and the court is satisfied that it rnay be necessary to 
apprehend him or her, the court rnay in its order authorize the guardian to 
do so; in that case the guardian may, with the assistance of a police officer, 
enter the premises specified in the order, between 9 a-m. and 4 p.m. o r  
during the hours specified in the order, and search for and remove the 
person, using such force as rnay be necessary. 
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person's objection, under the authority of S. 24 of the w t h  Care Co-t Act 
1 996.210 
The court may also grant partial guardianship: that is, make an order giving the 
guardian the power to make decisions in one of the areas outlined in S. 45, such as 
health care, an area in which the person is incapable to make decisions. Section 60 
of the Substitute Decisipns Act. 1992 . . provides the authority for the Court to make 
Orders for partial guardianship."' The authority of the guardian must be set out in 
the Order in relation to the powea listed in S. 59 (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the 
Substitute Dec1s-t. 1992 
. . .''* Therefore, if an Order was obtained from the 
Court for partial guardianship in respect of health care, by v h e  of S. 24 of the 
Health Care C ~ l l ~ e n t  A c t  1996, a guardian could consent to the admission of an 
*''S.O. 1996,~. 2, Sch. A. 
"'S.60 of the -tute Decisions Act. 1992 . . relates to partial guardianship: 
(1) Partial guardiansbip.--The court may make an order for the partial 
guardianship of the person for an incapable person if it finds that he or she 
is incapable in respect of some but not al1 of the functions referred to in 
section 45. 
(2) Same.--The order shall specify in respect of which fùnctions the person 
is found to be incapable. 
(3) Powers of guardiam--Under an order for partial guardianship, the 
guardian may exercise those of the powers set out in subsection 59 (2), (3), 
(4) and (5) that are specified in the order. 1 996, c. 2, S. 3 8. 
Act, 1992 S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 60 (3). 
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incapable person to a psychiatric facility for the purposes of treatment, even 
against the patient's own wishes.'" 
Second, a capable person may execute a power of attomey for persona1 care which 
confers authority on a substitute decision-maker to make decisions in the event of 
friture in~apacity.~]~ A grantor may authorize her substitute to have her admitted 
and detained in a psychiatric facility for the purpose of treatment. Section 50 (2) 
(2) of the S u b m t e  Decisions Actl 1992 . . provides this authority: 
A provision that authorizes the attomey and other persons under the 
direction of the attomey to use force that is necessary and reasonable 
in the circumstances to take the grantor to any place for care or 
treatment, to admit the grantor to that place and to detain and restrain 
the grantor in that place duting the care or treatment. 
In addition, a person who has been named under a Power of Attorney for Penonal 
Care [hereinafier "POAPC"] to make decisions on anothet's behalf in the event of 
future incapacity has the authority to consent to the incapable person's admission 
to a psychiatric facility for the purpose of treatment, even absent a speci fic 
'"It should be remembered that the provision applies if the person is over 16. 
1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 46 (1)  states: 
Power of attorney for personal care.--A person may give a written 
power of attorney for personai care, authorking the person or persons 
narned as attorneys to make, on the grantor's behalf, decisions conceming 
the grantor's personal care. 
provision in the POAPC. The -te Decisipns Act. 1992 
. . 
,2'5 authonzes a 
person narned as an attomey for personal care to make any decisions to which the 
H e a l t h s -  Act. 1 9 9 6 ~ ' ~  applies. Section 49 (1) of the Substitute 
-ions Act. 199Z2'' States: 
When power of attorney effective.--A provision in a power of 
attomey for persona1 care that confers authority to make a decision 
concerning the grantor's personal care is effective to authorize the 
attomey to make the decision if, 
(a) the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 applies to the 
decision and that Act authorizes the attomey to make 
the decision; or 
(b) the Health Care Cornent Act, 1996 does not apply to 
the decision and the attorney has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the grantor is incapable of making the 
decision, subject to any condition in the power of 
attomey that prevents the attomey fkom making the 
decision unless the fact that the grantor is incapable of 
persona1 care has been confirmed. 
Therefore, since the power to have a person admitted to a psychiatrie facility for 
the purposes of treatment is provided by the Wth Care Consent Act. 1 9962'8in S. 
24 ( l) ,  a person named as a substitute decision-maker through a Power of 
Attorney for Penonal Care can have the grantor admitted to hospital for treatment, 
- -- 
2'5S.0. 1992, c. 30. 
216S.0. 1996, C. 2, Sch. A. 
2"S.0. 1992, c. 30. 
2'aS.0. 1996, C. 2, ScL. A, S. 24 (1). 
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even absent a specific provision in the POAPC to do so. However, should the 
person, 16 years of age or older, refuse admission under the authority of his 
substitute decision-maker, such admission cannot be authori~ed.~'~ 
The Substitute Decisions Act- 1992 
. . does recognize that a penon in a facility may 
be restrained or confined under the authority of the common law, regardless of 
admission stahis. S. 66 (1 1) States: 
Common 1aw.--Nothhg in this Act affects the common law duty of 
caregivers to restrain or confine persoas when immediate action is 
necessary to prevent serious bodily harm to them or others. 
Again, this authority cannot be used as justification for restraint and confinement 
of a voluntary patient who is not posing a danger to herself or others. In particular, 
it cannot be used in order to justify restraining and detaining a voluntary person for 
the purposes of treatment (as opposed to restraint for the emergency situation). 
' I 9 m  Con-~ct. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 24 (2). Note that the 
term substitute decision-maker in this section of the chapter refers to a person who must 
make a decision for another who is treatment incapable, but does not refer to a guardian 
or person who has authority under a POAPC to restrain and detain the person for 
purposes of treatment. 
II. Treatmeat 
As noted earlier, legislation regardhg mental health is contained in main 
pieces of legislation in Ontario: the ~en-,"O the HkIWi- 
Act. 1996:~' and the Substitute Deci- Act. 1992 . . .= The word "treatment" is 
defmed only in the W t h  Care C o r n  Act. 1996." 
Involuntary treatment refers to a situation where an incapable person does not 
accept the treatment that has been ordered by his physician, and consented to by 
his substitute decision-maker. For example, if the physician had ordered 
medication three times per day by mouth, and the patient refused to take it, he 
could be restrained by the nursing staff and have the medication delivered by 
i n j e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  Similarly, if electroconvulsive therapy was ordered and the patient 
refused, nursing staff would be forced to restrain the patient to a stretcher and 
"'S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
224~t  shouid be noted that not d l  medications can be administered by injection as 
they are not manufactured in that form (e.g. Lithium Carbonate used in the treatment of 
people with bipolar affective disorder/manic depression). 
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administer any additional restraint necessary until the treatment was ~ompleted.~'  
The authority to administer involuntary treatment is contained in the W t h  Care 
Consent Act. 1 and the Substifute D e c i s w  Act. 1992 . . ."' The Mental 
Health ACP~ refers to treatment only in reference to the criteria for admission to a 
psychiatric f a c i l i p 9  and in relation to instructions regarding psych~surgery .~~~  
The Health Care Consent Act. 1996=' and the Substitute D e c ~ ~ o n s  Act. 1992 . . 232 
"AS should be apparent, the provision of involuntary treatment to a resisting 
patient is stressful for al1 persons involved. Foremost, the patient may be either angry or 
extremely fiightened, and undoubtably distressed. In addition, the nursing staff, those 
persons responsible for a c W y  administering the treatment that has been ordered by the 
physician and consented to by a substitute or attorney, are also placed under much stress. 
While aware of their role in administering treatment, many are uncornfortable when 
forced into such a seemingly combative role with the patient that is difficult to merge 
with the necessity of forming a therapeutic relationship with patients. In addition, there is 
also the risk of physical injury that can occur when restraining a person who does not 
wish to receive treatment. 
?S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
"S. 12 (regarding infonnal or voluntary patients), and S. 20 (1) @) (regarding the 
admission of voluntary patients following a psychiatric assessment) both state that 
admission is warranted if the person is in "need of treatment." 
Zj'S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
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use the words "capable" and "incapable" regarding a person's ability to make 
decisions, while many people continue to employ "competent" and "incompetent." 
A person may be declared mentafly incapable regarding treatment, '33 property,"' 
disc los~re~~~  or examination of his own clinical record,236 admission to a care 
fa~ility,~~' and consent to a personal assistance d e v i ~ e . ~ ~ '  This thesis will 
concentrate exclusively on persons who have been found to be incapable of 
making treatment decisions. 
U 3 w t h  Care Consent Act. 1 994. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 1 8. 
U4Mentêl He& Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 54. 
u 5 ~ e u  Health Ac, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 35 (3). 
U 6 ~ e n a  H u  Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 36 (1). 
U 7 H e a l m e ~ 6 ,  S.O. 1996,c.2, Sch. A, S. 40 (1). 
*8J-Iealth Care Consent Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 57 (1). S. 1 of the 
Act States: 
"personal assistance senice" means assistance with or s u p e ~ s i o n  of 
hygiene, washing, dressing, grooming, eating, drinking, elirnination, 
arnbulation, positioning or any other routine activity of living, and 
includes a group of personal assistance services or a plan setting out 
personal assistance services to be provided to a person, but does not 
include anything prescribed by the regdations as not constituting a 
personal assistance service. 
A) nt Act. 1 996239 
a) Treatment Capable Patients 
"Capacity" is defhed in S. 4 (1) of the w t h  Care Cornent Act 1995: 
A person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care 
facility or a personal assistance service if the person is able to 
understand the information that is relevant to making a decision 
about the treatment, admission or personai assistance service, as the 
case may be, and able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of a decision or lack of decision. 
A person is presumed to be capable unless there is "... reasonable cause to believe 
~thenvise".*~~ By extension of the definition of "capacity" set out in S. 4 of the Act, 
a person will be found incapable of making treatment decisions if she cannot 
understand or appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of giving or 
refüsing consent. 
If a person is capable, consent must be obtained fiom him to proceed with 
3 9 S . ~ .  1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
Care C o ~ t  Act. 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A., S. 4 (2) and (3) States: 
(2) Presumption of capacity.--A person is presumed to be capable with 
respect to treatment, admission to a care facility and personal assistance 
senices. 
(3) Exception.-A person is entitled to rely on the presurnption of capacity 
with respect to another person unless he or she has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the other person is incapable with respect to the treatment, the 
admission or the personai assistance service, as the case rnay be. 
treat~nent.~" For such consent to be valid it must be inforrned."' A "blanket" 
assessrnent of capacity does not exist: capacity is decision ~pec i f i c .*~~  Consent 
may be withdrawn at any time.z44 
'"Sec common law emergency exceptions at p. 73. 
Care Co- Act. 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 1 1 states: 
(1) Elements of Consent.--The following are the elements required for 
consent to treatment: 
1. The consent must relate to the treatment. 
2. The consent must be informed. 
3. The consent must be given voluntarily. 
4. The consent m u t  not be obtained through misrepresentation or 
fiaud. 
(2) Infonned consent.--A consent to treatrnent is infonned if, before 
giving it, 
(a) the person received the information about the matters set out in 
subsection (3) that a reasonable person in the same circumstances 
would require in order to make a decision about the treatment; and 
(b) the person received responses to his or her requests for additional 
infonnation about those matters. 
(3) Same.--The matters referred in subsection (2) are: 
1. The nature of the treatment. 
2. The expected benefits of the treatment. 
3. The material risks of the treatment. 
4. The material side effects of the treatment. 
5. Alternative courses of action. 
6. The likely consequences of not having the treatment. 
(4) Express or irnp1ied.--Consent to treatment may be express or implied. 
243J-Iealth Care Consent Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A., S. 15 (1) and (2) state: 
(1) Capacity depends on treatment.--A person may be incapable with 
respect to some treatments and capable with respect to others. 
(2) Capacity depends on timt--A person may be incapable with respect 
to a treatment at one time and capable at another. 
ZU-nt Act. 1995. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 14 states: 
Withdrawal o f  consent^-A consent that has k e n  given by or on behalf of 
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b) Treatment Incapable Patients 
In the event a person is found incapable of making decisions regarding treatment, a 
substitute decision-maker must be approached for consent?45 The t e m  substitute 
decision-maker [often referred to as SDM] is defined in the Health Care Consent 
Act. 1996 in S. 9:2' 
Meaning of Usubstitute decision-makerW.--In this Part, ' S ~ ~ b ~ t i t u t e  
decision-rnaker" means a person who is authorized under section 20 
to give or refuse consent to a treatment on behalf of a person who is 
incapable with respect to the treatment. 
The Healb Care Consent Act 1 996247 lists those persons who may act in this 
capacity in S. 20 (1). It should be noted that this list is hierarchical in nature: the 
person highest up on the list is to be approached fmt to provide substitute 
the person for whom the treatment was proposed may be withdrawn at any 
tirne, 
(a) by the person, if the person is capable with respect to the 
treatment at the time of the withdrawal; 
(b) by the person's substitute decision-maker, if the person is 
incapable with respect to the treatment at the time of the 
withdrawal. 
"'&&th Care Co- Act. 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A., S. 10  (1) (b). 
Exceptions to the requirement for consent will be discussed further at p 73. It should be 
noted that a person who disagrees with the fïnding of a physician that he or she is 
incapable of making treatment decisions may appeal such a fhding to the Consent and 
Capacity Board (S. 32 (1)). 
246~.0. 1996,c. 2, Sch. A. 
consent."' A substitute decision-rnaker (hercinafter SDM) must meet certain 
requirements as set out in S. 20 (2): 
Requirements--A person described in subsection (1) may give or 
refuse consent only if he or she, 
(a) is capable with respect to the treatrnent; 
(b) is at least 16 years old, unless he or she is the incapable 
person's parent; 
(c) is not prohibited by court order or separation agreement fkom 
having access to the incapable person or giving or refusing 
consent on his or her behalf; 
(d) is available; and 
(e) is willing to assume the responsibility of giving or refusing 
consent.249 
The substitute decision-maker must make an informed choice as set out in S. 1 1 of 
the Act. In order to make such a decision for an incapable person, the SDM must 
be provided with al1 necessary in format i~n .~~  
Any decision made by a substitute decision-maker on behalf of a treatment 
incapable person must be made according to any express wishes the incapable 
248&&b Care Co-t. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 20 (30). 
2 4 9 H e a l t h ~ ~ ,  S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
"O&&h Care Consent Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 22 States: 
Information.--Before giving or refusing consent to a treatrnent on an 
incapable person's behalf, a substitute decision-maker is entitled to receive 
al1 the information required for an informed consent as described in 
subsection 1 1 (2). 
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person made known while capable and over the age of 16? In the event such 
wishes are not known, or they cannot be complied with, a decision should be made 
following the best interests criteria set out in S. 2 1 (2). 
The question that arises at this point, given that the focus in this thesis is on 
invoiuntary treatment of voluntary patients, is what constitutes treatment-cm a 
substitute decision-maker consent to the actions necessary to deliver treatrnent to a 
voluntary, treatment incapable patient (e.g. physical restraint)? 
c) Definition of treatment 
"treatrnent" means anything that is done for a therapeutic, 
preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health-related 
purpose, and includes a course of treatment or plan of treatment, but 
does not include, 
(a) the assessment for the purpose of this Act of a peeon's 
capacity with respect to a treatment, admission to a care 
facility or a persona1 assistance service, the assessment for the 
purpose of the Substitute Decisiuns Act, 1992 of a penon's 
capacity to manage property or a person's capacity for 
persona1 care, or the assessment of a person's capacity for any 
other purpose, 
(b) the assessment or examination of a person to determine the 
general nature of the person's condition, 
(c) the taking of a person's health history, 
(d) the communication of an assessment or diagnosis, 
(e) the admission of a person to a hospital or other facility, 
251-~. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 21 (1). 
(f) a persona1 assistance service, 
(g) a treatment that in the circumstances poses M e  or no risk of 
hann to the person, 
(h) anything prescribed by the regulations as not constituting 
treatment . 
It might be argued that the phrase "anything done for a therapeutic purpose" in the 
definition in S. 2 (1) could include the actual physical restraint by the members of 
the health care team that is necessary in order to administer medication ordered by 
the physician, and consented to by a substitute decision-maker with appropriate 
authority, to treat an incapable patient. It could also be argued that it includes any 
mechanical restraint necessary to adrninister such treatment as electroconwlsive 
therapy (e.g. restraint to a stretcher). However, 1 would argue against such a broad 
interpretation. For the period that the incapable person is physically restrained by 
nurses to be given a needle, or restrained to a stretcher while having 
electroconvulsive therapy administered, she is unable to leave the facility. Her 
voluntary status, during that time, becomes, in actual fact, a nullity. Reading 
treatment broadly blurs the committal -involuntary treatment distinction that has 
been at the heart of law reform in this area for decadesz2 and is, indeed, reflected 
''As noted in Chapter 1, the law in Ontario of years past did not separate 
cnteria for commitment from decisions regarding consent to treatment. Once a 
person was admitted to a psychiatric facility, treatment was given. The M e d  
Health Act. 1962 separated criteria for involuntary cornmitment from the issue of 
treatment. The courts have recognized that capable persons have the right to 
refuse treatment and incapable persons in psychiatric facilities must have their 
in the clear statement in this section of the Act to the effect that treatment does not 
include admission to a hospital or other fa~ili ty.~'~ 
d) Exception to Consent Requirement 
e Health Care C w  Act. 1996 sets out that consent does not have to be 
obtained fiom another on the behalf of an incapable person in the event of an 
e m e r g e n ~ y . ~ ~  Section 25 (2) States: 
Emergeacy treatment without consent: incapable person.-- 
Despite section 10, a treatment may be administered without consent 
to a person who is incapable with respect to the treatment, if, in the 
opinion of the health practitioner proposing the treatment, 
(a) there is an emergency; and 
(b) the delay required to obtain a consent or refusa1 on the 
person's behalf will prolong the suffering that the 
person is apparently experiencing or will put the 
person at risk of sustaining senous bodily 
prior capable wishes honoured, even if that results in no treatment for psychiatric 
symptoms. If the - m e n t  Act. 1996 defmition of treatment included 
the authority to detain an incapable person to a psychiatric facility, the law would 
have regressed to the point it was pre 1967, taking the hard-fought victories for 
and by persons with mental ilinesses with it. 
L53J3eaIth Care Co- Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 2 (1) (e). 
z4c'Emergency" is defined in S. 25 (1) of the as: 
Meanhg of 'emergencym--For the purpose of this section and section 27, 
there is an emergency if the person for whom the treatment is proposed is 
apparently expenencing severe suffering or is at nsk, if the treatment is not 
adrninistered promptly, of sustaining serious bodily h m .  
2S5J-Iealth Care Consent Act. 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 25 (2). 
The authority to restrain a person in an emergency is found in the W l t h  Cars 
Consent Act 1996 in S. 7: 
Restraint, confinement.--This Act does not affect the comrnon law 
duty of a caregiver to restrain or confine a penon when imrnediate 
action is necessary to prevent serious bodily harm to the person or to 
others. 
Therefore, in an emergency a person can be treated without consent,'s6 and 
restraint can be used to deliver such emergency treat~nent.~" 
To surn up, voluntary, treatment incapable patients cannot be restrained for the 
purposes of treatment, except for in emergency situations, under the authority of 
the Health Care Consent Act. 1996. 1 now turn to a review of the other Acts to see 
if a different position can be supported on the basis of that legislation. 
B) Act. 1992 258 
Incapacity for personai care is defined in S. 45 of the Act: 
A person is incapable of personal care if the person is not able to 
understand information that is relevant to making a decision 
conceming his or her own health care, nutrition, shelter, clothing, 
hygiene or safety, or is not able to appreciate the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision. 
2 5 6 u t h ~ ~ - ,  S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 25 (2). 
2 S 7 & d t h ~ t ~ 1 9 9 6 .  S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 7. 
258S.0. 1992, c. 30. 
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A person who is incapable of making treatment decisions must have those 
decisions made by another. In order to prepare for a funue period of incapacity, an 
individual may execute a Power of Attorney for Persona1 Care (i6POAPC"). Many 
people have not executed such a document. Therefore, it is important to review 
the scope of decisions that can be made by another on the behalf of a treatment 
incapable person where a POAPC exists, and where one does not. 
a) Power of Attorney for P ersonal Care Exists 
A POAPC allows a named person to exercise decision making power should the 
grantor becorne incapable of making treatrnent de ci si on^.^'^ Any decision that is 
explicitly authorized in the POAPC may be consented to by the named attomey. 
A person may be given the authonty in a Power of  Attorney for Persona1 Care to 
force treatment on the incapable person. S. 50 (2) (2) States: 
A provision that authorizes the attorney and other persons under the 
direction of the attorney to use force that is necessary and reasonable 
in the circurnstances to take the grantor to that place and to detain 
and restrain the grantor in that place during the care or treatment.'" 
Should such an incapable, voluntary person resist treatrnent, the authority 
provided in the Power of Attomey for Personal Care would be sufficient for 
- - - -  - - - - - 
te Decwns  Act, 1992 . . , S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 46 (1). 
. . 
eci- Ac-, S.O. 1992, c. 30. 
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members of the health care tearn to restrain the person in order to administer 
treatmenf even over his or her objection. While it is tnie that the voluntary patient 
would then be prevented fiom leaving the facility during those times of restraint, 
this detention is legal since the named person exercising authority under the Power 
of Attorney for Persona1 Care also has the authority to consent to the detention of 
the person. It should be remembered that authority originated in the first place 
with the person who is now incapable, when he executed such a directive while 
capable. The penon acting as his substitute is following explicit instructions of 
the person who is now incapable. 
If there is no specific provision in the Power of Attorney for Personal Care for the 
named individual to have the now incapable peaon admitted, restrained and 
detained for the purposes of treatrnent, the substitute decision-rnaker can still 
attempt to have the person admitted to a psychiatric facility. However, if the 
person is 16 years of age or older, objects, and is voluntary the admission cannot 
be f~rced.*~'  Even if the person did not object to the admission to the psychiatric 
facility, I would argue that treatrnent could not be forced for the reasons given in 
the Section on the H e u  Care Co- Act. 1996.262 
- - - - 
261Health Care consent Act 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 24. 
262~ee  p. 7 1-73. 
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Where a POAPC explicitly does not give the authotity for another to consent to 
restraint for the purposes of treatment, it is clear that the substitute decision-maker 
could not provide such consent in the event of a fiiture period of incapacity. 
b) Where No Power of Attorney for Personal Care Exists 
The Substitute Dec- Act. 1992 
. . 
also sets out provisions for the appointment of 
a guardian by the Court, as set out earlier in this Cha~ te r .~~ '  The Court may 
appoint a guardian with powers to make decisions regarding health care if the 
person is incapable of making such decisions and has not executed a POAPC.'~~ A
full guardianship order would enable the guardian to make decisions regarding 
where the person re~ided?~' in relation to any matter to which the Health Carg 
Consent a ~ p l i e d : ~ ~  regarding the person's health care, nutrition and 
h~giene,'~' and any other powers specified in the court ~rder . '~ '  The authority of 
a person who has full guardianship over another may arguably be suficient to 
allow for restraint for the purposes of treatment since the person may make 
2 6 3 ~ e e  pages 57-6 1 . 
. . 
ec- 1 992, S.O. 1 992, c. 30, ss. 59 or 60. 
at S. 59 (2) (a). 
266&,& at S. 59 (2) (e). 
267~bi8, at S. 59 (2) (e. 1). 
2681bid, at S. 59 (2) (g). 
decisions regarding where the person resides. 
A person may be granted partial guardianship over an~ther . '~~  The authority of 
such a penon would be granted expressly in the Court ~ r d e r . ~ ~ '  Therefore, if 
authotity was granted to make decisions regarding health care and residence, an 
incapable person could be detained at a psychiatric facility and given treatment 
consented to by his guardian, even if restraint was required to administer such 
treatment. However, if the Order pertained only to the authority to make decisions 
regarding health care, the authority to have a voluntary, incapable person 
restrained for the purposes of treatment would arguably not be conveyed by the 
Order. Specific authority to detain anaor restrain would be required in the 
Order. 
C )  M e n t n 1 7 '  
The Mental Health ~ c f ~ ~  states: 
[n]othing in this Act authorizes a psychiatric facility to detain or 
. . 
ecuons Act- 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 60. 
270 . . e Dec- Act, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 60 (3). 
"'R.s.O. 1990,~.  M 7. 
"R.s.O. 1990, c. M.7. 
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restrain an infonnal or voluntary patientF3 
As has just been reviewed, the m t h  Care Consent Act. 1996 and the Substitute 
Decisions Act. 1992 provide that authority in some circumstances. 
The M e n a  H e m  AC^" does define "substitute decision-maker" in S. 1 : 
"substitute decision-maker", in relation to a patient, means the 
person who would be authorized under the W t h  Care Cownt  AcL 
1996 to give or refuse consent to a treatment on behalf of the patient, 
if the patient were incapable with respect to the treatment under that 
Act .... 
With the passage of the Eeaw Care ~ o ~ e n t t , _ 1 9 9 6 ~ ~ '  and the Substitute 
Decisi- Act. 1992;" the legislative guidelines regarding consent to treatment, 
and specifically involuntary treatment, were removed fiom the Mental He& 
However, the Mental Health Act remains relevant as it stipulates that 
psychosurgery cannot be performed on an incapable person, even with the consent 
273Men&l H e m k  R.S.0-, C. M.7, S. 14. However, as explicitly enunciated 
in both the Acu99& and Substitute Dec- Act. 1992, 
. . 
this prohibition against restraining persons does not affect the cornmon law duty of 
caregivers to restrain or confine persons in order to prevent serious bodily harm to 
the patient, or to others. See 55 and 63. 
of his or her substitute decisi~n-rnaker.~~~ Section 49 (1) states: 
Psychosurgery.--Psychosurgery shall not be administered to an 
involuntary patient, to a person who is incapable of giving or 
refusing consent to psychosurgery on his or her own behaif for the 
purpose of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, or to a peeon who is 
remanded or detained in a psychiaûic faciiity pursuant to the 
Criminal Code (Canada). 1987, c. 37, S. 1 1; 1992, c. 32, S. 20 (39); 
1996, c. 2, S. 72 (30). 
D) Common Law Applicable to Treatment 
a) no treatment is to be given without consent 
It has been a longstanding principle of Canadian law that anyone providing 
treatment, absent consent, or an exception to the consent will be liable for 
" ' ~  H e a A c ~  R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 49. It should be noted that S. 49 (2) 
stipulates that psychosurgery for the treatment of neurological disorders is not inciuded in 
the prohibitions in S. 49 (1). 
279 There are exceptions made for emergency situations: see Malette v. Shulmm 
(1 WO), 72 O.R. (2d) 41 7 (C.A.) where Justice Robins states: 
The emergency situation is an exception to the general d e  requiring a 
patient's pnor consent. When immediate medical treatment is necessary 
to save the life or preserve the health of a person who, by reason of 
unconsciousness or extreme illness, is incapable of either giving or 
withholding consent, the doctor may proceed without the patient's 
consent. The delivery of rnedicai services is rendered la- in such 
circumstances either on the rationale that the doctor has implied consent 
fiom the patient to the emergency aid, or more accurately in my view, on 
the rationale that the doctor is privileged by reason of necessity in giving 
the aid and is not to be held liable for so doing. 
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an action in battery.280 Deficiencies in the consent process (e.g. a lack of adequate 
information on which to make an informed choice ) which result in harm to the 
patient may result in heafth care personnel being liable in negligence?' 
This common law principle was considered in the psychiatric treatment context in 
Fleming v. The -wa3 contained a provision that allowed 
that the prior capable wishes of an involuntarily detained, incapable person could 
be ovemdden on application by a physician to the Review ~oard.*" S. 35 (2) 
stated: 
Psychiatric and other related medical treatment shall not be given to 
a patient, 
(a) where the patient is mentally competent, without the 
voluntary, informed consent of the patient; 
(b) where the patient is not mentally competent, 
(i) without the consent of a person authorized by section 1 
(a) to consent on behalf of the patient, 
(ii) unless the review board has made an order authorizing 
the giving of the specified psychiatric or other related 
medical treatment, or 
(iii) unless a physician certifies in writing that there is 
V- k b g k  (1980), 1 14 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 8- 1 1 (S.C.C.) (hereinafler JXeibl), 
supm note 279. 
28'JteiM, note 280 at 10-1 1, v. W c t e r ,  [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1 19, 
1 00 D.L.R. (4'") 609 at 6 1 7 (cited to D.L.R.) (hereinafter m). 
'82wÎmipo, s u p ~ ê  note 65. 
*%end H u  AcL R.S.O. 1 980, c. 262, S. 35(2) (b) (ii). 
imminent and serious danger to the life, a limb or a 
vital organ of the patient requiting immediate 
treatment and the physician believes that delay in 
obtaining consent would endanger the life, limb or a 
vital organ of the patient. 
Two patients held involuntarily and deemed incapable to consent to treatment at 
Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre had, when previously capable, made their 
wishes not to be treated with psychotropic medications known. The Official 
Guardian was appointed to act as these men's decision-maker. Following their 
prior known capable wishes, as directed by the Act, the Officia1 Guardian refused 
to consent to treatment with antipsychotics. The physician applied to the Board for 
treatment permission as set out in S. 35 (2) of the Act. The Officia1 Guardian 
challenged the constitutionality of this provision of the Mental Heal th~ct .~ ' '  
Although the two men, represented by the Officia1 Guardian, were unsuccessful at 
trial, the decision was overtumed by the Ontario Court of Appeal. In its reasons, 
the Court explicitly reinforced the cornmon law principle that no treatment was to 
proceed without the consent of a capable person or his or her decision-maker: 
The right to determine what shall, or shall not be done with one's 
own body, and to be free from non-consensual medical treatment, is 
a nght deeply rooted in our cornmon law. This nght underlies the 
doctrine of informed consent. With vety limited exception, every 
person's body is considered inviolate, and, accordingly, every 
competent adult has the right to be fkee from unwanted treatment. 
The fact that serious risks or consequences may result from a refusa1 
of medical treatment does not vitiate the right of medical self- 
detenninati~n.~'~ 
Since the Mental Act had legislated that the prior known capable wishes of 
a now incapable person must be f ~ l l o w e d ~ ~ '  it could not also include provisions in 
the Act to "... render those competent wishes, and the substitute's decisions based 
thereon, entirely meaningless when a treatment order is sought fiom the review 
board."288 
The Court of Appeal held that the provisions of the Mental He& Actg9 
authorizing that an involuntary treatment incapable person's pnor capable wishes 
could be overruled by an order of the Review Board violated s.7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Freedoms2* and could not be saved by S. 1. 
2 6 6 F ~ e w ,  note 65 at 85. 
"'w He&k&L R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. 1 (a) (6). 
x8m, note 65 at 93. 
290 FreedpmS, Part 1 of the -tmn Act, 1982, . . 
being Schedde B to the M a  Act 1982 (U-K)., 1982, c. 1 1. 
, 
b) consent must be informed 
The Supreme Court in v . 1 ~ p p ~ ~ '  held that in order to provide informed 
consent, a patient should be advised of the nature of the procedure to be 
perfomed, any material risks, and any risks that might be specifically important to 
the particular patient.292 The Court aiso recognized that the physician should answer any 
questions that the patient specifically put fonvard." These requirements attempt to 
balance the rights of persons to be informed while not imposing an arguably 
impossible burden on physicians to disclose every side effect of a proposed 
treatment that has ever been reported. 
Reibl v. -:94 decided shortly after fIppp v. L M ~ ~ ~ ~  by the S.C.C. reinforced 
the principle that any matenal nsks and risks that might be of particular 
significance to the patient must be disclosed by the physician. In addition, the 
Court adopted a modified objective test in relation to causation: 
... other aspects of the objective standard would have to be geared to 
what the average prudent person, the reasonable person in the 
patient's particular position, would agree to or not agree to, if al1 
29'[1980] 2 S.C.R. 192, 1 12 D.L.R. (3d) 67 (cited to D.L.R.) (hereinafter m). 
2 9 2 ~ ,  s y e ~ a  note 29 1 at 8 1. 
2wu note 280. 
295tlpep. SYDE~ note 291. 
material and special risks of going ahead with the surgery or 
foregoing it were made known to hirn. 
............................................................................................... 
In short, although account must be taken of a patient's particular 
position, a position that will Vary with the patient, it must be 
objectively assessed in tenns of rea~onableness.~~ 
Recently the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated the principles regarding 
inforrned consent set out in fLQpp v. m297 and Beihl v. Huehes.298 In -t v. 
Srni&*" Justice Cory reviewed the importance of recognizing informed consent: 
Jteibl v. Hunhes is a ver -  significant and leading authority. It marks 
the rejections of the paternalistic approach to detennining how much 
information should be given to patients. It emphasizes the patient's 
right to know and ensures that patients will have the benefit of a hi& 
standard of disclosure. 
........................................................................................................ 
The Beibl v. test has had the desired effect of ensuring that 
patients have al1 the requisite information to make an informed 
decision regarding the medical procedures they are ~ontemplating.~" 
c) consent may be withdrawn at any time 
. . .  The Supreme Court of Canada in v. -ctebM1 explicitly reinforced 
2"Ed2L =l= note 280 at 16- 1 7. 
'''a no te 29 1 . 
'98sypiIb note 280. 
2w(99(i997), 148 D.L.R. (4*) 48 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter m). 
3"')Jbid, at 56. 
301 - m. note 28 1. 
that consent, once given, may be withdrawn. Justice Cory considered this 
principle in light of the fundamental right of a person to control her own body: 
It should not be forgotten that every patient has a right to bodily 
integrity. This encompasses the right to determine what medical 
procedures will be accepted and the extent to which they will be 
accepted. Everyone has the right to decide what is to be done to 
one's own body. This includes the right to be fkee fkom medical 
treatment to which the individual does not consent. This concept of 
individual autonomy is fhdamental to the common law and is the 
basis for the requirement that disclosure be made to a patient. If 
during the course of a medical procedure a patient withdraws the 
consent to that procedure, then the doctor must halt the process. This 
duty to stop does no more than recognize every individual's basic 
right to make decisions conceming his or her own body.'02 
d) capable means possessing the ability to understand information and 
appreciate the consequences of a decision or lack of a decision 
Howlefl v. ~ a r u n a r a t i n e ~ ~ ~  set out the three elements required for proof of mental 
capacity to consent to treatment: 
To be "mentally competent" a person must: 
(1) Have the ability to understand the nature of the iliness for 
which treatment is proposed; and 
(2) Have the ability to understand the treatment proposed, and 
(3) Be able to appreciate the consequences of giving or 
302 W e l l p ,  - note 28 1 at 61 8-19. The Court did acknowledge that halting 
sorne procedures midway through their course might resuit in life threatening or serious 
problems for the patient. In these circurnstances, a doctor might be justified in 
continuing. The Court also recognized that a detemination of whether a person was 
capable at the time of withdrawing consent would have to be made. 
"'(1 988), 64 O.R. (2d) 4 1 8 ( Dist. Ct.) (hereinafter Jiowle~). 
These requirements were adopted by successive Ontario courts in 61- v. 
O ' D ~ h e r t y , ~ ~ ~  v. v. P e n e w e n e  M e d  H e u  
Centre?)'' and v. St. T h o r n  Psv-c Hospitêl . . .308 In Mc- the Court 
recognized that because of the patient's intelligence and her familiarity with 
mental illness that came fiom witnessing the experiences of her mother, she was 
able to recite information regarding mental illness and proposed treatments without 
difficulty. However, because she did not believe she was ill, and this denial 
formed part of her mental illness, the Court mled that she was incapable to make 
treatment decisions: she could not apply her knowledge regarding mental illness 
and treatment options to herse1f309 This requirement that the penon must 
aclcnowledge the presence of a mental illness and be able to apply the knowledge 
of proposed treatment or lack of treatment to himself or herself has been adopted 
3 m J - I ~ ~ 1 e ~ ,  note 303 at 42 1-22. 
305&f~I(iàYy note 152. 
'=, S U P ~ ~  note 165. 
"[l993], O.J. No. 3090 (C.J. (Gen. Div.)) (Q.L.) (hereinafter m). 
'08(i992), 7 OR. (3d) 303 (hereinafter ahpp). 
309pvl~r(iar, supro note 152 at 23-24. 
by the courts i n m , 3  I o  ~ y l o ~ : ?  ' ' and -.)l2 
e) involuntary hospitaüzation and incapacity are not synonymous 
Justice Robins in Flemine v. pa3" accknwledged that "[tlhe detemination of a 
patient as voluntary or involuntary is independent of any assessrnent of a patient's 
mental c~mpetency.""~ He went on to state that: 
. . .involuntary patients, including those who, like the appellants, are 
being held pursuant to the Criminal Code, are taken to have the 
capacity to decide for themselves whether or not to receive anti- 
psychotic drugs. Until they are found incompetent, they hold the 
sarne rights as any other competent patients in the facility. Indeed, 
they hold the same rights as competent persons elsewhere in the 
province whose consent m u t  be obtained before they can be the 
subject of medical treatrnent. Mentally il1 persons are not to be 
stigrnatized because of the nature of their illness or disability; nor 
should they be treated as persons of lesser stahis or dignity. Their 
right to persona1 autonomy and self-detennination is no less 
significant, and is entitled to no less protection, than that of 
competent persons s u f f e ~ g  nom physical ail ment^."^ 
Iorn, note 1 65 at para. 14. 
3' l m ,  sypzg note 307 at para. 1 1. 
 ha^, note 308 at 3 1 5. 
")-, note 65. 
3'4JbidL at 78. 
3'51bid. at 86-87. 
0 C o - a J  
Cornmitment status and incapacity to consent to treatment are two entirely 
different matters. A person can be an informal, voluntary, or involuntary patient 
in a psychiatric f a~ i l i t y .~ '~  Persons are either capable or incapable of making 
treatment decisions. The & l e m t h  Act. 1 96z317 separated the criteria 
necessary for involuntary admission and enquiries regarding treatment for the k s t  
tirne. Successive mental health legislation and interpretation by the judiciary has 
continued to delineate this separation. However, a patient's cornmitment status 
and his capacity to consent to treatment do have incidental connections important 
in determining whether treatment can be forced, even with valid consent fiom a 
substitute decision-maker. 
There are four categories of patients who may be resident in a psychiatric facility: 
1) involuntarily cornmitted and capable of making treatment decisions; 
2 )  voluntary and capable of making treatment decisions; 
3) involuntarily cornmitted and incapable of making treatment decisions; and 
4) voluntary and incapable of making treatment decisions. 
The law is clear regarding what must happen (or not happen) with respect to the 
first two categories of persons who refuse treatment. The law is not clear 
should be noted that a person may also be detained under the 
Code in a psychiatric facility but this situation will not be addressed in this thesis. 
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regarding the third and fourth categories. In order to understand what effect a 
patient's cornmitment status and capacity to consent to treatment may have on the 
ability to force treatment, al1 combinations of capacity/incapacity and 
voluntary/involuntary scenarios will be reviewed. 
A) involuntary and capable of making treatment decisions 
This principle was set out clearly in Fle- v. w3'' If an involuntary, capable 
patient, refüsing treatment, continues to meet the criteria for involuntary 
committal, he must be detained. He cannot, however, be forcibly treated. Many 
people, including psychiatrists like Dr. A.D. Milliken, fmd this situation 
intolerable: 
As a clinician 1 do not wish to be associated with restraint or 
incarceration without any form of treatment. To confine someone 
against their wishes because they are ill and yet not be able to 
provide the treatment which 1 know will be beneficial c m  only be 
described as repugnant. 1 believe that the majority of society would 
equally regard it ~0.'" 
However, no matter what the majority of society, or Dr. Milliken, thinks, the Iaw is 
clear that those capable of making treatment decisions must have those decisions 
respected. 
3'8Fleminn, ~ l p ~ i l  note 65. 
3'g~harles Pearson, "Consent to Psychiaîric Treatment in Canada--Specific Issues" 
2:2 Health Law Review 3 at 14, citing Dr. A.D. Milliken, "The Uniform Mental Health 
Act: A Clinician's Questions" (1987) 7 Health L. Can. 76 at 82. 
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B) voluntary and capable of making treatment decisions 
A capable person is one whose decisions regarding treatment must be re~pected.~" 
He may accept or refuse treatrnent. A voluntary patient must be discharged on 
reque~t.'~' In the event that such a person disagreed with the treatment proposed 
by the physician, she could leave hospital or seek to remain in hospital, but refuse 
treatment. Involuntary treatment of a capable person is outside the law. 
C) involuntary and incapable of making treatment decisions 
For treatrnent incapable penons, consent must be obtained fiom a substitute 
decision-maker. If consent is obtained, and the patient then resists, for example, to 
take his medications as ordered by mouth,)" they could be given by injection, 
using restraint if necessary. This may be justified because consent has been 
obtained for the treatment, and the restraint does not affect the person's abiiity to 
320Reibl, a note 280. 
"'AS noted earlier, although voluntary persons may ask to be discharged, many 
hospitals have policies that dictate that any person asking for discharge must be 
interviewed by a physician. In the event the physician finds that the person meets the 
criteria for cornmitment, the physician may certify him under S. 20 (5). 
'*'~t should be noted that 1 am making several assumptions here in my illustration: 
the consent mu t  be infonned, the substitute decision-maker must be the person entitled 
to give or refuse consent, and the necessary and appropriate orders must have been 
obtained from the physician to give the medications by mouth, or, if refbsed, by injection. 
Some medications, such as Lithium Carbonate (used in the treatment of manic 
depression) and anti-depressants are not manufactured in injection form and therefore, 
this scenario does not even arise. 
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ask for her discharge: she is already being detained under the authority of the 
M e n m t h  The question is, however, outside of the scope of this 
thesis and I take no position on this matter. It is an untested area of the law. 
D) voluntary and incapable of making treatment decisions 
According to the law in Ontario as it now stands, when a voluntary patient, who is 
treatment incapable refuses to comply with treatment, restraint for the purposes of 
treatment is pennissible iE 
a) a Power of Attorney for Personal Care exists with specific 
authority to restrain and detain; or 
b) no POAPC exists but the substitute decision-maker has a hl1 
guardianship order nom the court; or 
c)  no POAPC exists but the substitute decision-maker has a 
partial guardianship order fiom the court with specific 
authority to restrain and detain. 
If neither a), b) or c) exist, it is not pennissible to restrain a voluntary patient for 
the purposes of treatment. Therefore, there will be some instances when treatment, 
ordered by a physician and consented to by a substitute decision-maker, cannot be 
administered to a voluntary, treatment incapable patient. 
. onclusion 
The law regarding psychiatric hospitalization and capacity to make treatment 
decisions in Ontario is modelled on a dangerousness standard for cornmittal and a 
moderately liberal approach to capacity determination. Under the current 
legislative scheme, a voluntary, treatment incapable patient cannot be restrained 
for the purposes of treatment that has been ordered by her physician and consented 
to by a substitute decision-maker, absent authority contained in a Power of 
Attorney for Personal Care or a Guardianship Order . The existence of such 
Powers of Attomey for Penonal Care, or Guardianship Orders, are not 
~ornrnon.'~~ There fore, the perplexing situation c m  mise in which a voluntary 
patient deemed incapable of making treatment decisions cannot be provided with 
treatment considered to be in the best interests of the patient by both the health 
care team and the patient's smgate  decision-maker. This is a situation resulting 
fiom the current state of the law. The question that must now be addressed is 
whether the state of the law is acceptable. Have we found the right balance 
between promoting the well-being of mentally il1 individuals and protecting their 
rights, or have we, in seeking to distance ourselves fiom the abuses of the past, 
tilted too far in the direction of rights at too great a cost for well-being? 
'"1 am making this statement based on my experience as a Registered Nurse on an 
Acute Admitting Ward in a Provincial Psychiatrie Hospital. In my 1 3 years of practice 1 
have never seen a patient admitted or treated under either of these two routes. 
CHAPTER 3-ETHICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Introductiop 
From the review of the current status of the law in Ontario regarding the ability to 
force treatment on a voluntary, treatment incapable person that was carrïed out in 
Chapter 2,1 believe that, absent a guardianship order with appropriate authority or 
a Power of Attomey for Personal Care with a Ullysses type clause, the restraint 
and subsequent detention of a voluntary, treatment incapable person is illegal. 
Others may disagree with my interpretation of the law. However, it is at the very 
least, a fair statement that the law in this regard is not settled and my research has 
not located a single Canadian judgment on this issue. 
Proceeding on my belief that the restraint and incidental detention of a voluntary, 
treatment incapable person, absent the exceptions listed above and discussed in 
Chapter 2, is illegal, an analysis of whether or not the law should permit the 
involuntary treatment of a voluntary patient will now be undertaken. In this 
Chapter 1 will set out arguments for and against pennitting the involuntary 
treatment of voluntary patients.325 In each instance, 1 will fust set out the argument 
'*'It shodd be noted that throughout this Chapter 1 will be referring to the 
"involuntary treatment of voluntary, incapable persons". In doing so 1 am speaking of the 
group of persons who cannot be involuntarily treated, even despite substitute consent. 
Persons with guardianship orders or Powers of Attomey for Personal Care with a Ullysses 
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in the voice of those who would endorse the argument and then, under the heading 
"Considerations", assess the argument. 
1. S FOR PERbfJTTING THE- - 
F VOCUNTqaY. T-TWNT IN- 
PERSONS 
A) The Law in Ontario Recoguizes that Incapable Persons Need Decisioos 
Made for Them 
The present law in Ontario has set out an elaborate scheme whereby a person 
unable to make decisions regarding her treatrnent must have someone else consent 
on her behalf. This scheme is based on two fiindamental beliefs. First, in law no 
beneficial treatment is to proceed or be withheld without a valid c~nsent.~" A 
valid consent or refisal is understood as a fiee and infonned consent or refusal 
given by a person who understands the nature and significance of the decision 
being made. Second, an incapable person rnay not appreciate the consequences 
of giving or refusing consent."' If he does not understand, his refusal of 
treatment can prevent treatment and, in effect, an invalid refusa1 is being respected. 
If a treatrnent incapable person's refusal of treatment is respected, then a decision 
is being made by someone who may not be capable of understanding the nature 
type clause are not included in this group. 
'*6There are of course exceptions for emergency treatrnent. See p. 73. 
327&&h Care Cons-, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 4 (1). 
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and consequences of the decision. This flies in the face of contemporary infonned 
consent theory. 
This argument blurs the distinction between confinement and treatment. 
Contemporary informed consent theory concems itself with treatment, not 
confinement. The standard for hospitalization is dangerousness, not cornpetence. 
Under current law, the voluntary patient c m  walk out of the hospital. To permit 
blocking passage out of the hospital would be to erase the distinction between 
committal and treatment. Clearly, leaving the hospital would be exercising a 
choice that would preclude treatment. 
B) Young children, who are incapable of making treatment decisions, are 
restraioed by parents routinely in order to receive treatment 
Many a parent has physically restrained a young child in order for procedures such 
as booster shots, and medication to be administered to an unwilling, fearfbl child. 
It is extremely unlikely that such restraint would be considered illegal. By 
analogy, the restraint of mentally il1 adults for the purposes of treatment should be 
legally permitted (assuming valid consent has been given by a substitute decision- 
maker) . 
It is true that parents often restrain young children who are afhid of needles or 
who do not wish to take medications such as antibiotics. They obviously ought to 
have their decisions re medication respected. But what about the decisions 
regarding restraint? 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, it is my belief that any restraint that is incidental to 
the delivery of a treatment that has been consented to by a substitute decision- 
maker for a treatrnent incapable penon can be considered part of the treatrnent. 
The defmition of "treatment" in S. 2 (1) of the Health Care Consent Act. 1996~'' is 
broad enough to include restraint. However, the difficulty arises in that the 
restraint, although part of the treatment, results in an incidental detention of a 
voluntary patient. Unless the substitute decision-maker has the authority also to 
consent to the detention of the incapable person for the purposes of treatment, such 
restraint is, in my belief, i l~egal . '~~ 
However, the treatment and restraint of children for the purposes of treatment can 
be distinguished fiom the treatment and restraint of the mentally il1 . The common 
"'S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
12'See p. 92 for a summary of substitute decision-makers with authority to consent 
to the detention of a treatment incapable person for the purposes of treatment. 
law recognizes that parents are responsible for the care and custody of their 
9 -  children. In v. s Aid Society of Metr~-~'O the 
Supreme Court of Canada recognized the constitutional rights of parents to make 
decisions for children who are in their custody. Justice LaForest stated: 
... 1 would have thought it plain that the right to numire a child, to 
care for its development, and to make decisions for it in fbndamental 
matters such as medical care, are part of the liberty interest of a 
parent. As observed by Dickson J. in R. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd., 
supra,  the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum or absent a histoncal 
context. The comrnon law has long recognized that parents are in 
the best position to take care of their children and d e  al1 the . . ecisigns nece- to ensure their well-being. 
............................................................................................................... 
..In recent years, courts have expressed some reluctance to interfere 
with parental rights, and state intervention has been tolerated only 
when necessity was demonstrated. This only serves to confirm that 
the parental interest in bringing up, nurturing and caring for a child, 
including medical care and moral upbringing, is an individual 
interest of fundamental importance to our society . 33 ' [emphasis 
added] 
Parents may restrain theù children in order to, for example, have them immunized 
as such action can be characterized as in the best interests of the child. There is no 
liberty issue at stake. However, within the context of treatment of persons with 
mental illnesses, there is a liberty interest that should not be discounted. In fact, 
330[1995], 122 D.L.R. ( 49  1. 
"'~a v. dren s Aid Societv of Metrow)im Torom ? ' , note 360 at 
40-4 1. See also: &l~& v. (1972), 6 R.F.L. 180 (Ont. Prov. Ct.); v. 
(1 979), 25 0 . R  (2d) 673 ( Prov. Ct.); and Ontario Department of Justice, Ministry of 
Supply and Services, "Custody and Access: Public Discussion" (Toronto: Queen's 
Printer, 1974) at 7. 
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the legislation explicitly separates cornmitta1 and treatment issues recognizing this 
distinction. There is no provision for the substitute decision-maker of a treatment 
incapable person to make "al1 decisions necessary" as recognized by the common 
law in terms of parental power. 
C )  Assistance of Person to Potentially Achieve Optimal Quality of Life 
Many persons with mental illnesses function very well in society. Often a part of 
this success can be attributed to treatments used to control mental illnesses. A 
voluntary, treatment incapable person who refuses to comply with a course of 
treatment consented to by her decision-maker may be deprived of the opportunity 
to achieve optimal wellness if involuntary treatment is not given. 
While it is true that voluntary, treatment incapable patients may improve with 
hospitalization, this can not be used as justification for detaining an incapable' but 
not dangerous person.'j2 To rely on this to rationalize restraint for the purposes of 
treatment is to undermine the entire committal standards. 
33Wote: here 1 am referring to a person who does not meet the cornmitment 
standards of S. 20 (5) of the MentaI Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7. 
D) Western Society values assisting others wbo are vulnerable or potential 
victims of discrimination 
Canada, unlike some other countries in the world, has in place a system 
euphemistically referred to as a "social safety net". Many Canadians believe that 
there is some obligation to assist others who fmd themselves in circumstances that 
are less than optimal. As a result of this inclination to provide assistance, many 
persons in Canadian society believe that the involuntary treatment of individuals 
who cannot make that decision for themselves and are refusing to comply with 
treatment would be the appropriate course of action. This belief would be in 
keeping with the principle of beneficence; that is, the provision of assistance to 
peeons in need. 
As Justice Donald stated in McC- v. Pirector of Riverview Hospital Review 
Panel et aP": 
... Canadians want to live in a society that helps and protects the 
mentally il1 and that they accept the burden of care which has always 
been part of our tradition.334 
Since persons who are incapable of making treatment decisions are vulnerable 
members of society, assistance must be rendered. Part of that assistance will corne 
IÏom a substitute decision-maker. If consent is provided for treatment, that form of 
993), 104 D.L.R. (4&) 391 (B.C.S.C.). 
334~bid, at 419. 
assistance should be honored. 
The distinction that drives the central problem in this thesis (committal versus 
treatrnent) was introduced to combat discrimination and abuse of the vulnerable. 
Persons with mental illnesses were often subjected to acts that are now considered 
abuse, often by persons who felt they were acting with the patients'best interests in 
mind. On review it must be asked which was less discriminatory and harmfùl. 
On the basis of the limited data we have, we must conclude that arguments in 
favour of acting on the ba i s  of  what many feel is the best interests of persons with 
mental illnesses must faif. 
E) With treatment, some incapable persons may, in the future, be in a 
position to exercise autonomous decision-making 
Autonomy has been described as : 
...p eople's interest in making significant decisions about their lives 
for themselves, and according to their own values or conceptions of 
a good life. It is by having our self-deterrnination respected by 
others that we are able to exercise significant control and 
responsibility for our lives."' 
Autonomy is a highly pnzed concept in Western civilization. The ability to make 
"'Dan W. Brock "Good Decision Making for Incompetent Patientsy' (1 994) 6 
Hastings Center Report (Special Supplement) S8 at S9. 
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choices about one's own life and to have them respected is central to the concept 
of who one is and the very basis of personal fieedom. Persons who are treatrnent 
incapable, by definition, are not fùlly autonomous. Treatment may Uicrease a 
mentally il1 persan's autonomy. Therefore, the involuntary treatrnent of a 
treatment incapable person could be autonomy enhancing. In light of the 
emphasis that is placed on the ability to make decisions for oneself, the involuntary 
treatment of a person with a mental illness, with the goal of having that person 
potentially come to a position where he can make autonomous choices, should be 
an important consideration in favour of involuntary treatment. 
Considerations 
This is an argument that cannot be discounted. If it is possible that the person 
could come to the place, after treatrnent, where she was competent to exercise her 
autonomy and make decisions regarding her own life, this would be extremely 
positive. However, we need to distinguish voluntary, treatment incapable patients 
who are capable with respect to decisions that affect their liberty. For those who 
are capable in this respect, restraint for the purposes of treatment is a violation of 
their current autonomy. It would be hard to justify such an inningement for a 
potential füture enhancement of autonomy. 
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In addition, it should be noted that some persons, even despite treatment, will 
never be in a position to exercise autonomy. For these patients, this argument 
fails. 
F) Effort should be made to alleviate the potential suffering of persons 
with mental ülnesses whenever possible 
There have been many personal accounts regarding the psychic pain, and 
sometimes physical stressors, that accornpany psychiatric illnesses. Some persons 
are disoriented to tirne, place or person. Some are so depressed they cannot eat, 
sleep or, in extreme cases, move h m  one spot. Persons who exhibit manic 
symptoms may go for days without eating or sleeping, sometimes making 
extravagant purchases that bankmpt their families. Hallucinations may lead 
persons with illnesses such as schizophrenia to harm themselves or to hear voices 
telling them what worthless people they are. To allow a voluntary, treatment 
incapable person to continue in such a state, especially in light of the fact that by 
defmition he cannot appreciate the consequences of giving or refusing consent to 
treatment, appears to be an abdication of the responsibility of those of us in society 
with the ability to exercise judgment in such situations to end such suffering. It 
could also be characterized as pennitting suffering in spite of means available to 
alleviate such suffering. 
This is perhaps one of the most compelling arguments in favour of involuntary 
treatment of voluntary, incapable patients. it is particularly troubling to know that 
a persons' situation could be improved, sometirnes dramatically, if treatment was 
provided. Relatives and health care providers are often in the position of having 
witnessed the penon in previous sirnilar episodes when treatrnent was given and 
improvement followed. Therefore, they know îhat the person's symptoms could 
be reduced or eliminated. 
G )  Alleviatioa of anguish of relatives and friends who must watch persoo 
remain il1 witbout the provision of treatment 
Friends and relatives experience rnuch distress watching their loved ones 
experience the symptoms and behaviours associated with mental illness. This is 
particularly the case when the person does not meet the cnteria for involuntary 
committal but leads a life punctuated by constant hallucinations, poor self care and 
chronic shelter difficulties. A relative is oAen the substitute decision-maker for 
such a person. Once consent is provided, according to the guidelines set out in the 
Health Care Consent Act. 1996,"~ the substitute decision-maker is often relieved 
to think that treatment will be given. It is a harsh blow to learn that no treatment 
336~.0. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A: decisions mut be made by a substitute in accordance 
with pnor known wishes made whiie comptent or best interests (S. 21). 
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can be given, despite consent, to a voluntary, treatment incapable person who 
refuses to CO-operate. The alleviation of this stressor for the relatives and fiiends 
of persons who refuse to comply with treatment, despite consent, would be 
bene ficial. 
It is particularly difficult to watch someone in distress a d o r  a state of less than 
optimal functioning when one knows that there could be improvement with the 
administration of treatment. Relatives, fkiends and health care providen often find 
themselves in the position of 'Watching fkom the sidelines" while the patient 
refuses to accept treatment. However, again, it rnust be remembered that the 
mental health legislation has been constructed to attempt to achieve balances 
between competing rights and to ensure that protections are put in place whereby 
abuses of the past will not reoccur. The stress on family and fiiends cannot be 
taken into account in this balancing. This is not to Say, however, that these stresses 
should be ignored. Alternative methods of relief ought to be sought. 
H) Protection of Membek of Society from Potentiai Future Harms 
Persons with mental illnesses that are left untreated may, in the future, have their 
symptoms exacerbate. This exacerbation may lead them to h m  others in the 
1 O6 
community. In addition, a voluntary, treatment incapable penon with a mental 
illness may have her symptoms exacerbate to the point that the risk of harm to self 
or others is so great that she needs to be committed. Minimal restraint used now is 
justified to prevent the need for greater restraint in the fùture. 
First, it must be remembered that persons who pose a danger to others can be 
committed. Therefore, there is no increased harm to others in the comrnunity. 
Second, statistics reveal that it is only a small number of persons with mental 
illnesses in the comrnunity who will potentially harm themselves or othen: 
% of Canadian adult population who are seriously mentally il1 
(e. g. schizophrenia, psychopathic (antisocial personality 
disorder), manic-depressive (bipolar disorder), severel y 
depressed or suffering fiom panic disorder or obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour): 2.8% (or 846,000 persons) 
estimated number of Canadians with severe mental illness 
who are not institutionalized and are a potential danger to 
themselves or others: 27,000 to 54,000337 
It should be noted that the above statistics include persons who will h m  
337~ichael Valpy, "Mental Illness: Cleaning out the Cuckoo's Nest7' The Globe 
and M d  (7 March 1998) D 1, citing statistics compiled nom the Ontario Medical 
Association, Ontario Ministry of Health, Don Jail (Toronto), Clarke Institute of 
Psychiatry (Toronto), Daily Telegraph (London), Queen Street Mental Health Centre 
(Toronto). 
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themselves andor others. The nurnber of persons with a mental illness in the 
cornmunity who are a threat to others (e.g. not just to thernselves) will be even 
lower. 
The fear that al1 persons with mental illnesses are dangerous can be described as 
"sanism:" 
'Sanism' is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character 
of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in ) 
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexisrn, homophobia, and ethnic 
bigotry. 
.................................................*...................*......................................... 
. . . . . based largely upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and 
deindividuaiization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of 
9 338 false 'ordinary cornmon sense . 
As c m  be seen from the above, there is no certainty that persons with mental 
illnesses will be dangerous, and infiingements on their liberty must be done with 
the acknowledgrnent that this prejudice may be unjustly influencing decisions 
cloaked in beneficence. 
I) Reduction of coaflict for health care professionals 
The inability to provide treatment that is clinically recognized as being beneficial 
in alleviating symptoms of mental iliness is a cause of stress and fhstration for 
'"~ichael L. Perlin "Decodîng the Right to Rehise Treatment Law"(1993) 16 
International Journal of Law & Psychiatry 1 5 1 at 1 70. 
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health care providers. Many enter their profession with the desire to effect change 
and "help people". When presented with a voluntary, treatment incapable person 
who resists treatment and who by iaw the health care provider cannot force to have 
treatment, many feel impotent and question the basis of their career choice. 
A situation such as that described above may result in "moral di~tress."~~' This 
phenornenon has been descnbed as follows: 
Moral distress occurs when moral choices cannot be translated into 
moral action. For nurses, moral distress is common. It arises when 
situational constraints make them feel unable to implement their 
moral choices for their patients. This distress is associateci with 
feelings of guilt, anger, fnistration and powerlessness. Moral 
distress appears to be an important constituent of nurse's stress and 
burnout. 340 
Being a health care provider in a psychiatrie facility in Ontario in the 1990s is an 
extremely difficult job. There are stressors that confiont such individuals at every 
turn. However, feelings of impotence and stress in situations such as voluntary, 
treatment incapable persons refising to comply with treatment despite appropriate 
substitute consent cannot be used alone as a justification for advocating the ability 
339Patricia Rodney and Rosalie Starzomski "Constraints on the Moral Agency of 
Nurses" (1 993) 89 (9) Canadian Nurse 24. 
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to force treatment in such situations. Giving such weight to these feelings would 
be inappropriate, since the prirnary focus should be on the patient. Consideration 
of the impact of this situation on health care providers, similar to the situation of 
members of the patient's family or group of fnends, should not be discounted, but 
neither should it be determinative. Alternative means of dealing with the feelings 
that accompany the refusal of treatment by a voluntary, treatment incapable patient 
should be sought. 
A) Undermining a system desiped to maximue the protection of and 
respect for the various interests of persons with mental illnesses 
The system regarding committal and treatment of persons with mental illnesses in 
Ontario has been changed repeatedly over the last two centuries. Many of those 
changes, as reviewed in Chapter 1, were put in place to recognize that persons with 
mental illnesses had been subject to abuses and had very few protections available 
to them. In order to prevent m e r  abuses and in recognition of the fact that the 
justifications for involuntary confuiement are distinct from those for involuntary 
treatment, the issues of comrnittal and treatment were separated: the standards are 
different and the decision-makers are different. 
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Today in Ontario a person can be detained in a psychiatric facility if he or she 
meets criteria set out in the -th Act."' Absent being a danger to self, 
danger to others, or exhibiting an inability to care for oneself that would result in 
imminent and senous impairment, a person cannot be invoiuntarily detained under 
the Mental Health Act. To allow restraint for the purposes of involuntary 
treatrnent would be to blur this distinction. Consider, for example, a person who is 
addicted to alcohol or other dmgs. Pari of the treatment of the addiction might be 
confinement to a controlled environment in which the drugs would not be 
available. In other words, involuntary confuiement in a psychiatric hospital. This 
could be fiarned as restraint for the purposes of treatment. Yet it is no different 
than involuntary hospitalization. 
To endorse the involuntary treatment of a voluntary, treatment incapable person 
would nulliw a system that has been created to set apart committal criteria tiom 
treatment decisions. In actual fact, such a melding of the two would efTectually 
undercut the present philosophy behind the mental health legislation that exists in 
Ontario today . 
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B) Places too mucb power in the hands of substitute decision-makers 
Should substitute decision-makers be allowed to consent to the detention of the 
incapable person for the purpose of treatment, outside of the authority contained in 
a guardianship order, or a Power of Attorney for Personal Care with a Ullysses 
type clause, they would arguably, in effect, have similar powers to detain that have 
currently been given only to physicians under the Me-4.342 However, 
there are no procedural protections in place to ensure that any such decisions 
would be reviewed. Unlike guardianship orders which have been granted afier 
court involvement, or a Power of Attorney for Personal Care that has been 
executed by the person while capable, and subject to strict procedural 
requirements,343 the decision of a substitute in these circumstances would go 
unchecked. Such power over another, absent protections, would be at odds with a 
system that has been designed to ensure that persons with mental illnesses are not 
again subjected to abuse of power by others and their various interests are 
appropriately balanced against each other. 
Conclusion 
While there are compelling reasons to consider instituting changes that would 
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result in the ability to involuntanly treat al1 voluntary, treatment incapable persons 
who have had treatment consented to by a substitute decision-maker, it is my 
position that the reasons against instituting such changes outweigh the reasons for 
doing so. 
The question that remains is whether there are any options that might be pursued to 
alleviate the difficulties associated with the dificult situation of a voluntary, 
treatment incapable patient resisting treatment other than legislative reform 
directed at permitting involuntary treatment of treatment incapable voluntary 
patients. In Chapter 4 1 will review such suggestions, rejecting some and adopting 
others. 
CaGfTER 4-ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE 
PROBLEM 
Introduction 
A number of legislative changes have been suggested to deal with the problem of 
voluntary, treatrnent incapable patients, who resist taking medication by mouth, or 
to comply with other treatments. Such changes include broadening the current 
cornmitment criteria, increasing the authority of substitute decision-makers, andor 
legislating that al1 voluntary patients be capable to consent to treatment and 
admission. In addition, some might suggest an application to the court to exercise 
its p a r a  power would be appropriate in this situation. Each of these 
possibilities will be reviewed, and the reasons for and against such courses of 
action will be evaluated. 
Ultimately, it is my belief that al1 of the suggested legislative changes are 
inappropriate responses to the problem. Additionally, 1 do not believe that 
appealing to the court under its mtria~ jurisdiction would be appropriate or 
successfül. However, 1 will not conclude that nothing can or should be done. 
Rather, 1 will argue that education of health care personnel, farnily, niends and 
lawyers regarding the powers of the legislation currently in effect is necessary. As 
Michael Bay pointed out "...we have a crisis in misapplication of the treatment 
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r ~ l e s . " ~ ~ ~  1 believe that the law is sufficiently broad, when understcod and applied 
correctly, to achieve the correct balance between the competing considerations 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
In addition to implementing education regardhg the powen of the current 
legislation, 1 will argue that the increased and improved use of advance directives 
should also be supported. A person who has periods of capacity can empower her 
substitute decision-maker to have her detained and treated during a future period 
of i n c a p a ~ i t ~ . ~ * ~  With adequate procedural safeguards, the use of such advance 
directives has many ad~an tages ,~"~  and could reduce the number of persons who 
subsequently become incapable of making treatment decisions but cannot be 
involuntarily treated under the current legislative scheme. 
1. Chawes to the Current Mental Heath Lgislation 
A) The Commitment Criteria 
Commitment criteria can be divided into three main categories: 
1) the need for treatment; 
2) modified need for treatrnent (sometimes referred to as the 
~~~~~ 
344 Bay, note 16 at 126. 
Act- 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 50. 
"%ee p. 13 1. 
"hybrid" rn~del) ;~~'  and 
3) bodily harm or physical dangerousne~s.~~~ 
Ontario's law regarding civil cornmitment is based on a dangerousness standard. 
In order to be involuntarily detained or admitted to a psychiatrie facility in Ontario, 
one must have a mental iliness and pose a danger to self, danger to others, or 
exhibit an inability to care for oneself that will result in imminent serious or 
physical i rnpa i~ment .~~~ 
It might be argued that a solution to the problem of a treatment incapable voluntas. 
patient resisting treatment is the broadening of the cornmitment cnteria to include 
treatment incapable patients needing treatment. However, a number of arguments 
can be made against this potential solution. 
a) Unjustified assumption 
To see broadening the cornmitment criteria as enabling the involuntary treatment 
of treatment incapable individuals is to assume that involuntary patients can be 
restrained for the purposes of treatrnent. However, as stated earlier in this thesis, it 
3'7The "modified need for treatment" mode1 is a cornmitta1 standard that contains 
elements of both the need for treatment and a bodily h m  or dangerousness criterion. 
3 4 a M ~ C ~ r ~ ,  note 333 at 407-408 (citing expert testimony of Dr. John 
Gray). See dso Reich, note 15 at 419. 
3 4 9 ~ e @  Heath &, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 15 (1) and 20 (5). 
is not clear that this assumption is true. 
b) Minimal impairment 
Broadened cornmitment criteria may result in mso violations in that the 
restrictions on liberty do not pass the minimal impairment test in S. 1. Ontario 
already has one of the highest rates of institutionalization in the ~ o r l d . ~ ' '  Relaxing 
the commitment criteria to a mode1 based on the need for treatrnent to prevent 
significant deterioration will potentially result in the increased involuntary 
detention of persons with mental illnesses. As Pierce identified, after studying the 
broadening of Washington's cornmitment criteria to include danger to self or 
others, danger to property, and/or those gravely disabled, an increase in the total 
number of involuntary admissions re~ulted.'~' 
The seriousness of the loss of liberty that occurs as a result of involuntary 
commitment in a psychiatrie facility cannot be underestimated: 
1 of the Constitution Act. 19&2 . . , king Schedule B to the -da Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 1 1. 
351Bloom and Bay, note 13 1 at 7. 
'"Gien L. Pierce, Mary L. Durham and William H. Fisher " The Impact of 
Broadened Civil Cornmitment Standards on Admissions to State Mentai Hospitals" 
(1  985) 1 42: 1 American Journal of Psychiatry 104 at 1 07. It shouid be noted that Pierce 
went on to state that he believed that more community senrices would have accomplished 
the same result (providing care for those persons in need) but was not initiated because 
involuntary commitment was cheaper. 
[clommitment raises serious ethical concems. It involves depriving 
persons of their fieedom for days, weeks, or longer, usually by 
incarcerathg them in a locked psychiatric facility ."' 
Because of this deprivation of liberty, comrnitment criteria should be narrow, 
rather than broad. This principle was recognized by the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
in Thwaites v. w t h  Sciences Ceme Psych~tnc Fac . . m." n e  Court held that 
Manitoba's cornmitment criteria, based on a need for treatment rno~ie l ,~~~ lacked
objective   rite ria.''^ Justice Philp stated: 
... 1 do not think it can be said that, in the absence of a 
'dangerousness' or like standard, the provisions impair as little as 
possible on the right of a person 'not to be arbitrarily 
detained' .....p rovisions strike the wrong balance between the liberty 
of the individual and the interests of the community. In the absence 
of objective standards, the possibility of compulsory examination 
and detention hangs over the heads of al1 persons suffering fkom a 
mental disorder, and the availability and suitability of alternative and 
353Rei~h, S U P ~ ~  note 1 5 at 4 1 8. 
3"[1988] 3 W.W.R. 2 li(hereinafler Thwai t~)  .
3ssSs. 9 (1) and 15 (1) of Manitoba Mental Heath Act. R.S.M. 1970, c. M 110 
stated: 
S. 9 (1) Where a duly qualified medical practitioner issues a medical certificate to 
the effect that he has examined the person therein, and that the person should be confïned 
as a patient at a psychiatnc facility, the person may be admitted to a psychiatric facility as 
a compulsory patient. 
s. 15 (1) Where any person in Manitoba is or is suspected or believed to be in the 
need of examination and treatrnent in a psychiatric facility and the person refhses to be 
medically examined for the purpose of detennining his mental condition, any person may 
apply to a magistrate or a provincial judge for an order compelling the person to be 
medically examined. 
3MThw& note 354 at 229. 
less restrictive forms of treat~nent.~" 
In support of his ruling, Justice Philp cited the comments of Justice OYSullivan 
(dissenting) in m v .  GJobennan:"' 
1 think the concept of mental illness is an elastic one; great care must 
be taken that, while properiy upholding legislation to assist and 
protect those pesons who are disturbed in their mental or emotional 
processes, we must not allow legislahws and administrators to 
impose more restriction on liberty than is reasonably necessary. 1 
think the test for determinhg whether restriction is necessary must 
be much more narrow than the test constituted by good faith 
perception of govemment authorized psychiatrists that the 'welfare' 
of a patient requires compulsory detention or treatment. 
...*................................................*...........-.......................................... 
... compulsory detention should be restricted only to cases where it 
can fairly be said that there is substantial danger to the prospective 
patient or other~.''~ 
Statements such as those above reinforce the principle, enunciated in 
litigation, that if a right is to be i n h g e d ,  it must be done so in the least restrictive 
rnar~.ner.~~ Broadening the cornmitment criteria as suggested, arguably does not do 
so. It is overbroad insofar as it captures even those patients who are not resisting 
treatment. Furthennore, the burdedbenefit ratio is not favourable as many 
"'Thwait~, SU PI^ note 356 at 230-3 1. 
358(1986) 27 D.L.R. (49  583 (Man. C.A.) (hereinafter m). 
"-, ylprp note 358 at 590. 
v. -, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; Ford v. Ouebe~, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712; & . . 
V. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; B4SS v. New BilbllS-3çkSEhQol Dlsmct No, 
fi, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825. 
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individuals will have their liberty restrained in order to facilitate the involuntary 
treatment of a few. 
While it is disturbing for many people, particularly family members and health 
care personnel, when the above situation occurs, it is this rny belief that, in 
actuality, it occurs infrequently. "' This belief is based on the fact that most 
voluntary, incapable patients do not resist the treatment that has been ordered by 
their physician and authorized by their substitute decision-rnaker. Statistically, 
only about 10% of al1 psychiatrie patients refuse treat~nent.'~~ The sub-percentage 
of those patients who are voluntary and incapable will be small. As Cleveland 
concluded, in relation to the dangerousness mode1 of civil cornmitment: 
... the literature provides little support for the belief that current legal 
standards of cornmitment severeiy constrain psychiatrists who are 
confronted with patients in serious need of treatment .................... 
.............................................................................................................. 
No doubt some cases do occur in which psychiatrists feel 
unavoidably constrained by commitment statutes. These wrenching 
3 6 ' ~ h i s  belief is based solely on my persona1 experience. In my 13 years as a 
Registered Nurse at St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital, 12 of which were spent on the most 
active admitting unit, 1 have witnessed this occurrence only four times. The Ministry of 
Heaith keeps no statistics on this situation, only the numbers of voluntary versus 
involuntary patients. Neither S t. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital, Whitby Psychiatric 
Hospital, or Queen Street Mental Health Centre collect data regarding the incidence of 
such occurrence. 
362Michael McCubbin and David N. Weisstub "Towards A Pure Best Interests 
Model of Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent Psychiatric Patients" (1988) 2 1 : 1 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1 at 17. 
situations, which probably leave deep and lasting impressions on the 
hospital staff, are most likely to be remembered as representative 
cases more for their distinctiveness than their prevalence. They may 
be considered a major concem mostly because of their ciramatic 
quality rather than their actual number~. '~~ 
The broadening of cornmitment criteria in order to rectify the situation where 
voluntary, treatment incapable penons cannot be involuntarily treated, could 
potentially result in the deprivation of liberty for a much larger number of 
individuals than is currently the case. The inningement of the liberty interests of 
many, to address the inability of physicians to currently force treatrnent on a few, 
would fail the minimal impairnent requirement for limits on Charter rights. 
c) Potential a buse 
Broadening the cornmitment criteria in the way suggested blurs the distinction 
between comrnittal and treatrnent and renders mentally il1 patients vulnerable to 
abuse. Early Ontario legislation permitted involuntary hospitalization to a 
psychiatric facility simply because one was diagnosed with a mental i l l n e s ~ . ) ~  
Subsequent acts required that the person have a mental illness and require care in a 
363~arah Cleveland, Edward P. Mulvey, Paul S. Appelbaurn and Charles W. Lidz 
"Do Dangerous-Onented Laws Restrict Hospitalization of Patients Who Need 
Treatment? A Test" (1 989) 40:3 Hospital & Community Psychiatry 226 at 270. 
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CS Acg S.O. 185 1, c. 82, S. 3; Ac& 
S.O. 1853, c. 188, S. 7; Ac- for -, S.O. 1870-71, C. 18, S. 
5 ;  An Act R e s D e f t i n n v  - of m e  Persom, R.S.O. 1887, 
c. 245,s. 7 ; T h e H o s p i t n l s f o r ~ A c ? , R . S . O .  1914,c.295,s.8. 
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psychiatrie fa~ility.'~' Under these very broad requirements for committal, many 
persons were deprived of their liberty and ultimately were the recipients of very 
intrusive procedures. These procedures were perfonned in the narne of treatment? 
often with the best of intentions fiom well-meaning phy~icians,'~~ sometimes with 
consent, and sometimes without. 
Hospitalization and treatrnent were not separated until the recent past; in fact, 
treatment was not even separately mentioned in the legislation until 1 9 3 5 . ~ ~ '  In
1967 the Me& He& Act, 1 967368 separated the criteria for cornmitta1 fiom 
issues surrounding treatment. Should Ontario broaden the cornmitment criteria to 
a need for treatment model, or some variation of the need for treatrnent model, the 
distinction between committal and hospitalization will once again be blurred. 
Some people may scoff at predictions of potential abuse of powers and 
infnngements on the rights of persons with mental illnesses in the modem age. 
However, examples of misuse of power continue. The homfic deeds of Dr. Ewen 
365 
Act, S.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 20 (2). 
'%ee Chapter 1. 
1tai.s Ac& S.O. 1935, c. 39, S. 15. 
368S.0. 1967, c. 5 1. 
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Cameron took place as recently as the 1 9 5 0 s . ~ ~ ~  Michael Bay, Chair of Ontario's 
Consent and Capacity Board, revealed that in 1996 a physician, upset with a 
political figure, attempted to use the authority granted by the M e n u l t h   AC^^^^ 
to have the person detained for psychiatnc e~arnination.~~' The medical director at 
Riverview Hospital in British Columbia, after a critical accreditation comment, 
was able to reduce the number of involuntary comrnittals nom over 90% to 60% in 
two years using the same Iegislative criteria that was available previously when 
more persons with mental illnesses were involuntarily detained. In Ontario, one 
psychiatrie facility discharged 90% of their involuntary patients just prior to 
review by the Consent and Capacity Board.372 These exarnples indicate that the 
potential for abuse, directed towards persons with mental illnesses, continues to be 
present. Broadening the cornmitment criteria, reminiscent of the early statutes 
regarding persons with mental illnesses in Ontario, would allow physicians to 
detain more persons, thus increasing the potential for abuse. 
3 6 9 ~ e e  Chapter 1, pages 20 and 26. 
370R.S.0. 1990, c. M.7. 
37'Bay, note 16 at 124. 
3fZm. at 126. 
d) Misplaced decision-making authority 
The current M e d - ~ t f ~ ~  empowers physicians to involuntarily detain and 
admit penons who are a danger to themselves, to others, or exhibit an inability to 
care for them~elves."~ Substitute decision-makers (not physicians) are empowered 
to make treatrnent decisions. This division of authority is grounded in a belief that 
physicians are best situated to determine dangerousness3" and substitute decision- 
makers (e.g. family members of the incapable person) are best situated to 
determine best interests or prior wishes. To broaden the cornmitment criteria is to 
give physicians the authority to make best interests judgments. There is, however, 
the need to recognize that physicians are not in the best position to determine if 
treatment is in keeping with the goals and values of the patient's life.376 They are 
not situated nor have the expertise to make such judgments since these are moral 
(value-based) and not only medical judgments. 
3 7 4 ~ ~  Heal-, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, ss. 15 (1) and 20 (5). 
375Even this has been criticized: see JvIcCo&& note 333 at 408; Reich, 
note 15 at 422 and Curt R. Batol, "Parens Patriae: Poltergeist of Mental Health 
Law" (1 98 1) 3 :2 Law & Policy Quarterly 191 at 193. 
'"~ichael A. Jones, "Patients Who Refuse to Consent to Treatment: The Legal 
and Ethical Response" (1 995) Health Law Review 17; Donald H. J. Hermann 
"Autonomy, Self-Determination, The Right of Involuntarily Committed Persons to 
Refuse Treatment and the Use of Substituted Judgement in Medication Decisions 
Involving Incompetent Persons" (1 990) 13:4 International Journal of Law & Psychiatry 
361 at 383-84; Reich, note 15 at 1268. 
B) Increasing the Power of the Substitute Decision-Moker 
It might be suggested that the legislation be expanded to give al1 substitute 
decision-makers the power to authorize restraint for purposes of involuntary 
treatment of treatrnent incapable persons. However, there are several reasons that 
this suggestion is unacceptable. 
a) Blurs the distinction between committal and treatment 
Enabling al1 substitute decision-makers to authorize restraint for the purposes of 
treatment would blur the distinction between cornrnittal and treatment and would 
lead back towards a mental health system where one penon made the majority of 
decisions about both admission and treatrnent. In 1967 the Ontario legislature 
separated the criteria for admission and questions regarding treatment3" The 
capacity to make decisions regarding treatment, and the criteria for holding a 
person with a mental ilhess involuntarily, are two very discrete issues. This 
position is now clearly enunciated in law.)" Legislating increased power to the 
substitute decision-maker, to authorize restraint for the purposes of treatment, in 
spite of voiced objection, could threaten to erode or at least, impinge on this 
distinction. 
377-t 1967, S.O. 1967, c. 5 1. 
'''Eleminn, note 65; I<han, yipta note 308. 
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b) Absence of procedural protections 
Giving more power to substitute decision-makers in respect to treatment incapable 
patients will blur the distinction between committal and treatment. Persons who 
lose their liberty through the comrnittal process have access to challenge this 
process through an application to the Consent and Capacity ~ o a r d . " ~  Extending 
power to a substitute decision-maker to authorize the restraint, and consequential 
loss of liberty, of a treatment incapable voluntary patient in order to force 
treatrnent, would be outside of the procedural protections currently in place. 
There is potential for abuse of persons with mental illnesses by those who have the 
power of making treatment decisions in their stead or who may have a vested 
interest in having the person remain hospitalized. If the legislation was changed to 
include the authority for al1 substitute decision-makers to authorize restraint in a 
psychiatrie facility, coupled with the power already possessed to consent to 
invasive treatrnents, the potential for abuse would be increased. 
C) Require that Voluntary Patients be Capable of Consenting to 
Admission 
Currently in Ontario there is no requùement that a person must be capable to be 
admitted or to continue as a voluntary patient. In Manitoba the W-âIftr 
3 w t h  Act., R.S.O. 1990, C. M.7, S. 39. 
M 8 0  specifically recognkes that voluntary patients must be competent to consent 
to admission: 
When a psychiatnst examines a person under subsection (1) and is of 
the opinion that 
.................................................................................... 
(b) the person is not suitable to undergo a psychiatric 
admission other than as an involuntary patient because 
the person refuses or lacks the capacity to consent to 
voluntary admission; 
the psychiatrist may admit the person as an involuntary patient of the 
psychiatric facility by completing and filing with the medical officer 
in charge a certificate of involuntary admission in the form 
prescribed by the reg~lations.~" 
Similarly, Prince Edward Island also requires that al1 voluntary patients be capable 
of consenting to admission.382 However, Ontario and the remaining jurisdictions in 
Canada do not specifically require capacity to consent to psychiatnc admission. 
Several jurisdictions in Canada, including Ontario, do include a stipulation that a 
"'w H e  Act, S.M. 1991-92, c. 4, S. 16 (1.1). 
'%ee Jbfend He- S.P.E.I. 1994, c. 39, S. 13 (1) (b) which states: 
A psychiatrist who has received an application for an involuntary 
psychiatric assessrnent of a person under subsection 6 (1) and who has 
assessed the person may confhm the admission of the person as an 
involuntary patient of the psychiatric facility by completing and filing with 
the administrator a certificate of involuntary admission in the fonn 
prescribed by the regulations if the psychiatrist is of the opinion that the 
person 
...................................................................................... 
(b) is rehising or is unable to consent to voluntary admission. 
person may be involuntarily committed if he or she is "...net suitable for admission 
or continuation as an informal or voluntary patient."'" Bloom and Bay offer the 
following interpretation of what "not suitable for continuation as an informa1 or 
voluntary patienty' may mean: 
The inclusion of the second requirement in S. 20 (5) 
&&b Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.71 suggests that Uivoluntary 
admission may be viewed as a last resort. While the Act does 
not explain what it means to be suitable for admission as an 
informal or voluntary patient, this requirement clearly is not 
satisfied if the person refuses to be admitted as a voluntary 
patient. 
In addition, the requirement may not be satisfied if the person 
requires fiequent restraint or seclusion, or if u t u r e  of thc 
wrson's m 
or her consent to 
sion c m o t  be rel ed on. [emphasis added]'" 
There has been no case law regarding what "not capable to consent to admission" 
might mean. Therefore, to date in Ontario, there is no clear requirement that a 
person must be capable of consenting to admission or continuation as a voluntary 
patient in a psychiatric facility. 
Since capacity to consent to admission and capacity to consent to treatment are 
"'m ~e&& R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 20 (5)  (b). See also Mental He& 
&, S.Y. 1989-90, c. 28, S. 13 (1) (b); An Act to M e n a  Hedth Act, S.N.B. 
1993, c. 59, S. 8.1 (1); and=- Act, S.A. 1988, c. M-13.1, S. 2. 
'"Bloom and Bay, SYPI& note 13 1 at 125. 
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entirely distinct categories, the suggestion that al1 voluntary patients must be 
capable to consent to admission does not dissolve the problem of voluntary, 
treatment incapable patients refiuing treatment. 
D) Requiring that Voluntary Patients be Capable of Consenting to 
Treatment 
Should al1 voluntary patients be required to be capable of consenting to treatment 
there would be no place for those persons who were incapable of making treatment 
decisions and who did not meet the comrnitment criteria. Cornmitment and 
treatment are two distinct enquiries. There would be no place in Ontario's current 
mental health system for those persons. Similady, voluntary, treatment incapable 
persons who were complying with treatrnent that had been consented to by their 
substitute decision-rnaker would also have no legislative place in the current 
Ontario mental health system. 
Mile it is true that the potential for abuse of voluntary, incapable persons may 
exist, separate mechanisms to address the needed protections for this category of 
persons with mental illnesses should be investigated, rather than mandating that al1 
voluntary patients must be capable to consent to treatrnent. 
IL O se of the Court's P a r e m m a e  J~agdictiop * * O  
The Court also has the authority, under its pareu jurisdiction, to make 
decisions for those person who are incapable and need protection. This 
longstanding power of the Court was discussed at length by Justice LaForest in & 
Ev~.~ ' '  In that case the Court declined to endorse the sterilization of an 
incompetent young woman at the request of her mother. The Court held that while 
it had the authority to make decisions based on its parens p e  power, it declined 
to do so because, in this case, the surgical procedure was not proposed for the 
incompetent person's therapeutic benefit but as a means of birth control which 
would have eased the girl's mother's concems regarding an unwanted pregnancy 
and her potential responsibilities for any child that would have resulted. 
While the Court may still exercise its p_are~~ power today, in the 
circumstances of a voluntary, treatrnent incapable person who resists treatment that 
has been consented to by a substitute decision-maker, the Mental Health legislation 
provides a complex scheme for court-appointed guardians and ousts the court's 
parens patriae jurisdiction . Therefore, it is my belief that applications to the court 
in this type of situation for the court to exercise its pxens patriw power will not be 
'"(1 986) 3 1 D.L.R. (4&) 1 (S.C.C). 
HL CO- IJse of Specific Foims of Advance D . 
Advance directives allow persons who are capable to appoint a representative and 
to clearly set out instructions for fiiture periods of incapacity. In the circumstances 
of mental illness, many people have periods of capacity, followed by periods of 
incapacity. These fluctuations often are comected to the disease process. 
Persons with a mental illness could execute an advance directive that could 
empower their substitute decision-maker with the authority to have them admitted, 
detained and restrained in the event they become incapable and refuse treatment. 
" m e  House of Lords has very recently had the opportunity to d e  on a case 
regarding a voluntary, treatment incapable individual who was a patient in a psychiatrïc 
faciIity. In Re L. (Bos next fiend G&J, [1998] H.L.J. No. 24 (Q.L.), the House of 
Lords ruled that this person was justifiably detained and treated as a result of the common 
law duty of necessity and, in addition, as a result of the duty of care professionals owe to 
patients in their care. It should be noted that the Court specifically held that the 
patriae power of the Court to make decisions in regards to adult persons who are 
incapable no longer exists in their jurisdiction. While the ability for hospitds and 
physicians to detain and treat voluntary, incapable persons was upheld based on necessity 
and deference to physicians acting in their patients' best interests, Lord Steyn expressed 
great concem over the Iaw as it exists currently that would provide little, if any, 
procedural protections for such patients. 
While it appears in England a voluntary, treatment incapable person could be 
involuntarily treated, it should be noted that the legislative scheme in Ontario is so 
different as to render cornparison of little practical value. For example, Justice Latham 
held in the case of B, v. Ex Pme  Smith . . - , [1998] 
T.N.L.R. No. 362 (Queen's Bench, U.K.) (Q.L.) that the power to detain persons with 
menta1 illnesses implied a duty to treat. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the legislation in 
Ontario explicitly separates the power to detain fiom the ability to force treatment. 
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In this way, the situation of a voluntary, treatment incapable patient who is 
resisting treatment and cannot be involuntarily treated would not arise. 
A) Advantages of Advance Directives 
a) Promote and reflect autonomy 
As detailed earlier in Chapter 3, autonomy is a principle that is highly respected in 
North America. To allow a person to exert her autonomy, in preparation for a time 
when this will be impossible (e.g. when incapable), is to give recognition to the 
importance this principle has attained in our society. In the context of mental 
illness, a capable person, knowing there may be fbture instances where she may 
become il1 but not meet the cornmitment criteria, could execute a power of attorney 
for persona1 care that authorizes her substitute decision-maker to consent to the use 
of force for the purposes of treat~nent.~~' The use of an advance directive promotes 
the autonomy of the person by respecting her wishes, while at the sarne time 
enabling treatment to be given, even in the face of subsequent resistance, voiced 
while incapable and in the midst of an exacerbation of her disease. 
. . 
Act. 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 50 (2). See Dan W. Brock, 
"A Proposal for the Use of Advance Directives in the Treatment of Incompetent Mentally 
111 Persons" (1 993) 7:2/3 Bioethics at 25 1.. 
b) Reduce (atbeit not eiiminate) the instances of voluntary, treatment 
incapable persons who cannot be treated without legal reform that 
increase harms (e.g. overbroad reforms discassed earlier) 
The use of advance directives would address some situations where voluntary, 
incapable persons resist treatment that they would have consented to had they been 
capable without requiring massive legislative changes. The proposed legislative 
changes could result in potential large inhgements on the liberty of persons with 
mental illnesses by broadening the commitment critena or increased abuses or 
conflict of interest by substitute decision-makers. 
As detailed earlier, it is my belief that broadening the commitment criteria is not an 
appropriate response to attempt to address the situation where voluntary, incapable 
patients resist treatment and cannot be forcibly treated.''' While encouraging the 
use of advance directives, it is recognized that this proposition will not prevent this 
situation f?om o c c u ~ g .  For instance, some persons will not execute such 
documents, other people who do  make use of such instruments will direct their 
SDM to refuse treatment, and some persons with mental illnesses may not have 
periods of capacity in which to execute such a document. However, the use of 
advance directives would provide the needed authority in some cases to detain and 
treat a voluntary, incapable patient, without introducing massive legislative 
changes that would create separate di fficulties. 
c) Eliminates uncertainty 
The physician, other members of the health care team, and family members would 
be aware that, in the event of treatment resistance by a treatment incapable 
voluntary patient, authority nom the individual patient existed to administer such 
treatment involuntarily. The substitute decision-maker would know that explicit 
instructions had been provided for him to follow in the event such a situation 
occurred. Therefore, the use of advance directives, while providing the authority 
to restrain for the purposes of treatment an incapable, voluntary person, would also 
relieve much of the anxiety that accompanies the uncertainty concerned individuals 
face when attempting to provide support for a person with a mental illness. 
B) Disadvantages of Advance Directives 
a) Potential abuse 
The authority to have a person restrained for purposes of treatment is a very 
serious matter. By executing an advance directive with this power, the grantor is 
authorizing infringements on her liberty and bodily integrity. 
It should be recognized that pressure might be exerted by family members, health 
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care personnel and the substitute decision-maker to execute this type of power of 
attorney. This pressure may be subtle and may not be created by improper 
motives. For example, as detailed above, the existence of an advance directive, 
containing authonzation for restraint for the purposes of treatment alleviates much 
of the stress and uncertainty facing those persons most intimately comected with 
the patient. They may tmly desire the best for the penon who may have 
subsequent pends  of incapacity. Nonetheless, such pressure impinges on the 
ability of the person to make a voluntary choice regarding executing such a 
directive. Other instances could occur where coercion or influence was exerted on 
the person to execute an advance directive for improper purposes such as a family 
member's vested interest in having the person detained outside the home, or 
pressure nom others to accept treatment that one does not agree with. 
However, in response to such concems the authorization of such wide powers to 
another can (and indeed is) accompanied by strict procedural  protection^.'^^ With 
''The Subatute De- A& 1992 . . , mandates that any advance directive 
bestowing such authority on another must be accompanied by the following 
procedural protections: 
S. 50 (1) Special provisions. --A power of attorney for persona1 care 
may contain one or more of the provisions descnbed in subsection 
(2), but a provision is not effective unless both of the following 
circumstances exist: 
1. At the time the power of attorney was executed or 
within 30 days afienvards, the grantor made a 
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these protections in place, the use of advance directives could respect the 
autonomous decisions of the previously capable individual, and provide certainty 
and decreased anxiety for health care professionals, family members, and 
substitute decision-makers without running the risk of abuse. 
N. - duc&on ppd Use of C m n t  L-tive Powers 
The legislation in Ontario regarding mental health issues is complex. It is my 
statement in the prescribed form indicating that he or 
she understood the effect of the provision and of 
subsection (4). 
2. Within 30 days after the power of attorney was 
executed, an assessor made a statement in the 
prescribed form, 
i) hdicating that, after the power of attorney was 
executed, the assessor performed an assessment 
of the grantor's capacity, 
ii) stating the assessor's opinion that, at the time of 
the assessment, the grantor was capable of 
personal care and was capable of understanding 
the effect of the provision and of subsection (4)' 
and 
iii) setting out the facts on which the opinion is 
based. 
Brock proposes that similar safeguards be put in place for the use of advance 
directives by persons with mental illnesses: 
a) must be executed while competent; 
b) a third party must ensure that the patient was competent at the 
time; 
C) a third party must ensure that the person was not coerced; and 
d) such instruments could be time-limited. 
See Brock, note 387 at 252. 
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position that instead of advocating for change in the mental health legislation, 
more education is needed for family, niends, health care providers and legal 
personnel. By becoming farniliar with the cunent legislative provisions and 
powers, the situation where a treatment incapable, voluntary patient cannot be 
involuntarily treated may be reduced. 
A) Family and Friends 
Under S. 55 of the Substitute Decmns Act. 1992 . . ,390 any person may apply to the 
Court to be appointed an incapable person's g~ardian.~~'  Therefore, a relative or 
&end, concemed about the treatment incapable, voluntary penon's refusal to 
comply with treatment could apply to the Court to become his or her guardian. If 
sufficient author@ is conferred by the Order of the Court,392 a guardian would 
have the authority to make decisions regarding not only treatment but restraint for 
3 9 1 ~ .  55 (1) States: 
Application for appointment.-The cour? may, on any person's 
application, appoint a guardian of the person for a person who in incapable 
of personal care and, as a result, nceds decisions to be made on his or her 
behalf by a person who is authorized to do so. 
It should be noted that S. 57 of the Act sets outs some persons who may not be appointed 
guardians. 
392Full guardianship (-te D w  . . S . O .  1992,~. 30,s. 59)or 
partial guardianship with explicit power regarding restraint (S. 60) may be ordered by the 
Court. 
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the purposes of treatment in a psychiatric f a~ i l i t y .~~ )  Such authority would be 
suficient to ovemde a treatment incapable, voluntary penon's refisal to comply 
with treatment. The education of fiends and family about the provisions in the 
mental health legislation regarding guardianship should be encouraged as a 
potential avenue of addressing the problem of treatment incapable, voluntary 
patients who resist treatment. 
B) Health Care Providers, the Legal Community and Members of the 
Consent and Capacity Board 
The mental health legislation in Ontario, as in other jurisdictions, is complex and 
extensive. While often criticized for its perceived lack of ability to address certain 
patient situations, including the inability to involuntarily treat a voluntary, 
treatment incapable patient, 1 believe that the law is sufficient, while the 
understanding of  it is not. 
Many health care providers, lawyen and even some membea of the Consent and 
Capacity Board are unfamiliar with the meaning of the law, and therefore, do not 
apply the provisions when they could, or apply them inappropriately. In particular, 
. . education regarding the guardianship provisions of the Substitute Decisions Act. 
. . ecisigns Act. 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 59 (2) (a) and (e). 
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1992395 and Powers of Attorney for Persona1 care3" is lacking and should be 
encouraged. Additionally, health care providen who do not understand the 
meaning of the legislation may believe that they can restrain voluntary, treatment 
incapable patients who resist treatment, when in actual fact they do not have this 
It is because of confusion regarding the meaning of the legislation that many 
people, including Dan Newman, a Pariiamentary Assistant to the Minister of 
Health, who prepared a review of the mental health system, have stressed the need 
for education: 
I was told by a number of individuals and groups that Our 
govermnent must educate those in the mental health system about the 
intent and application of the Act as an initial step before proceeding 
with legislative changes. As well, 1 was told that there was an 
immediate need for an education and training program for mental 
health workers and professionals, including the need for cross- 
sectional education and training. 
......................................,.................................................*.......... 
During my consultations, 1 was told that confusion and 
misinterpretation exists within the mental health system and the 
broader public regarding the intent and application of the M e d  
He& Act and related legislation. Our government has an 
obli- to ensure that professionals, providers, 
consumer/survivors and their families, and the broader public are 
394S.0. 1992, c. 30, ss. 59 and 60. 
ns Act 1 992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 50. 
educated about our provincey s legislation. [emphasis addedI3% 
A lack of understanding concerning the powers of the current mental health 
legislation should not be used as a justification for proposing changes that could 
result in increased liberty inhgements on persons who have been diagnosed as 
mentally ill. This has been suggested by some groups, including the Coroner's 
Inquest into the death of sportscaster Brian Smith, who was shot by a person with a 
mental illness who believed that his thoughts were being broadcast by the media.3g7 
The Inquest recornrnended that: 
The term 'imminent' should be deleted fiom the Mental Health A c t  
sections relating to the criteria for psychiatric assessrnent and 
examination, certification of involuntary admission, certificate 
renewal and patients' application for renewal. 
Rationale: This term is continually misunderstood and misapplied 
and implies a time fiame that is too restri~tive.'~' 
To suggest that a provision be removed nom an act simply because some persons 
do not know what it means, or apply it inappropriately, is not logical. Many 
'%Dan Newman, "2000 and Beyond: Strengthening Ontario's Mental Health 
System (A Report on the Consultative Review of Mental Health Reform in the Province 
of Ontario)" June 1998, 12 and 16. 
3970ntario, Coroner's Inquest into the Death of Brian Smith (1 997 1 1 25) 
(Coroner: Dr. B. Bechard) at 3 (hereinaer Coroner's Inquest). 
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legislative terms are open to interpretation and removing them for convenience is 
not appropriate; nor will such action address the problem of lack of understanding 
of the Acts. In addition, such a suggestion centers on the position of the physician 
and possibly the public's interest and does not address the potential m e r  
infringements on the liberty of individuals with mental illnesses. 
Instead of suggesting changes to the current mental health legislation because 
some people do not know what powers are contained in the Acts, it would be more 
appropriate to address the lack of education that enables such misperceptions to 
persist. It is suggested that there is very little effective continuing education for 
health care personnel regarding the provisions of the mental health legislation. 
While educational opportunities for health care professionals regarding the current 
mental health legislation is perceived to be inadequate, so is the training of the 
persons who sit on the Consent and Capacity Board. During the Brian Smith 
inquest, testimony was presented that revealed that there is no formal education or 
training process in place for those persons who are memben of the Consent and 
Capacity Board. The Ministry of Health has not provided any funding for the 
implementation of such a program but the Chair, Michael Bay, is attempting to 
develop a program on his own. The Consent and Capacity Board, charged with 
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providing protections for persons involuntarily detained, and deemed incapable to 
make treatment de ci si on^,'^^ is not provided with the resources to ensure that al1 
members are educated regarding the current status of the law, and that decisions 
from diflerent members and/or different regions will be consistent. This should 
not be perceived as an incrimination of the Board, but indicates the low pnority the 
government places on the appeal process for persons with mental i l l n e s s e ~ ~ ~ ~  
As discussed earlier, the number of persons who are voluntary and incapable to 
make treatment decisions and cannot be involuntarily treated is, I believe, ~rnall.~*' 
Any suggestion that the current mental health legislation should be changed to 
'99The Consent and Capacity Board is also the appeal body for other decisions, 
including : 
a) capacity to manage one's estate (Jidental HeaIth Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, 
S. 60 (1)); 
b) capacity to review or permit disclosure of his or her clinical record 
(Mental He& Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 36 (14); 
c) capacity to consent to admission to a care faciIity (Jiealth Care Consent 
Act- 1 996 S .0 -  1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 50 (1)); and 
d) capacity to consent to decisions regarding personal assistance services 
(Heaith Care Consent Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 65 (1)). 
4 m ~ t  should also be understood that Michael Bay, the Chair of the Consent and 
Capacity Board, is the only full time member, while other members are part-time, and 
paid on a fee-for-service basis. While there are nine regional "offices", these "offices" 
are "...nothhg more than file drawen in the private offices of our regional vice-chairs 
who manage the day-to-day work of the board." Michael Bay works nom his home, 
preferring that to the "broom closet" the govemment has assigned him. See Bay, ylpyâ 
note 1 1 at 127. 
40'See pages 1 19-120. 
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ensure that this situation never occurs, absent attempts to provide educational 
opportunities to ensure that the law is applied as it should bey would be 
inappropriate. Visiting M e r  infihgements on persons with mental illnesses 
because health c- professionals, family members, persons in society at large, 
lawyee and members of the Consent and Capacity Board do not understand the 
law as it currently is drafted, prejudices the interests of those with mental illnesses. 
There will always be criticisms regarding the status of the mental health Iegislation 
in Ontario. Dissatisfaction will occur as the legislature attempts to balance the 
rights of individuals to have their liberty respected and autonomy promoted versus 
society's perceived role to provide protections for treatment incapable persons and 
put in place systems that ensure that care can be provided for them. The inability 
to forcibly treat some voluntary, treatment incapable persons occurs as a result of 
the need to balance these competing rïghts. When such a situation occurs it can be 
very fhstrating for al1 persons involved. However, to suggest changes that would 
ensure that this situation could not occur, such as changing the comrnitment 
criteria, increasing the authority of substitute decision-makers, and/or mandating 
that al1 voluntary patients be capable of consenting to treatment, could result in 
increased infringements on other persons with mental illnesses. For the reasons 
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detailed in the preceding pages, 1 would not support such changes. In addition, 1 
would also not endorse applications to the court to use its power in 
this situation shce the comprehensive legislative scheme conceming guardianship 
has essentially ousted that court's authority in this area. Instead, the use of 
advance directives should be encouraged, and, perhaps more importantly, efforts to 
educate professionals and the public regarding the actual powee and protections 
contained in Ontario's mental health legislation should be pursued. 
CONCLUSION 
While incomprehensible to some, the ability of a voluntary, treatment incapable 
patient to veto treatrnent that has been ordered by her physician, and consented to 
by a substitute decision-maker on her behalf, should not be viewed as a failure of 
the mental health legislation. Instead, it should be viewed as a recognition of the 
advances that we, as members of society, through our elected representatives in the 
Ontario legislature, have made in our understanding of persons with mental 
illnesses. Once believed to be persons to whom society owed no consideration 
regarding forced confinement or involuntary treatrnent, Ontario now has in place a 
legislative scheme that narrowly defmes who may be deprived of their liberty and 
recognizes that consent for treatrnent must be obtained. In the event a person with 
a mental illness is not capable of providing such consent, a substitute decision- 
maker has been entrusted with that authority. In addition, the current legislation 
clearly separates considerations regarding involuntary cornmitment and issues 
surrounding treatment. 
It is true that health care professionals, families and substitute decision-maken 
may find the inability to force al1 voluntary, treatment incapable patients to take 
treatment very disturbing. However, amending the legislation so that this situation 
could not occur is not an acceptable alternative. Broadening the cornmitment 
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cnteria to a type of need for treatment mode1 would potentially i n h g e  the liberty 
of a large group of persons with mental illnesses. To impose such an infkingement 
on many, to potentially enable treatment of a few is not justified and runs the risk 
of infiringhg the Charter minimal impairment requirement. In addition, to endorse 
such action implies that restraint for the purposes of treatment of involuntary 
patients is permissible: it is not clear that this assumption is true. Broadening the 
cornmitment criteria also blurs the distinction between cornmitta1 and treatment 
and could potentially result in abuses like the past. Additionally, changing the 
legislation could result in misplaced decision-making authority: that is, the power 
to commit and the power to make substitute decisions could be melded. 
Similady, increasing power to the substitute decision-maker is also not an 
appropriate response. The power to make treatment decisions on another's behalf 
that could infkinge on the patient's bodily integrity is a formidable responsibility. 
To add the authority to restrain a person for the purposes of treatment, absent 
instructions contained in a POAPC or a guardianship order is placing too much 
authority in one person. Such authority could be used to the patient's detriment 
and there are no procedural protections in place to ensure abuses do not occur. 
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While initially attractive, the suggestion that the legislation be amended to require 
that al1 voluntary patients be capable to consent to treatment or admission is also 
an inappropriate response. Any such requirement would entwine the issues of 
committal and treatment that have been strategically separated since the Mental 
Health Act. 1 967402 and subsequently reinforced by the judiciary403 
Although 1 would not support legislative reform in response to the inability to 
force treatment on a voluntary, treatment incapable person, the encouragement of 
the use of advance directives by persons with mental ilinesses would be supported. 
By executing an advance directive while capable , a person with a mental illness 
would be making an autonomous choice regarding care during future periods of 
incapacity. Thus autonomy could be respected, albeit in an indirect way. A Power 
of Attorney for Persona1 Care would also alleviate the stress of family members, 
health care personnel, and the substitute decision-maker because of the certainty of 
knowing that treatment may be forced if necessary. It must be recognized that 
encouraging the use of advance directives will not result in the eradication of 
instances where voluntary, treatment incapable persons cannot be treated. 
However, the numbers may be reduced, without amending the legislation which 
402S.0. 1967, c. 5 1. 
'O3-, note 65; m, ylpyp note 308. 
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would result in M e r  inhgements on the rights of other persons with mental 
illnesses. 
The current legislation includes a comprehensive scheme for the appointment of 
guardians of persons who are incapable of making decisions. It is my belief that 
many people, including farnily members and substitute decision-makers of persons 
who are incapable of making treatment decisions, are unaware of the provisions of 
the legislation in this regard. Education of these groups should be encouraged so 
that an application to the court may be made for guardianship. The obtaining of 
such an order would eliminate the inability to involuntarily treat some treatment 
incapable, voluntary patients. 
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this thesis is the necessity of 
advocating M e r  education of health care professionals, the public, members of 
the Consent and Capacity Board, lawyers, and patients regarding the current 
mental health legislation in Ontario. The law is complex and it has been revised 
several times over the past eight years. It is difficult to envision how al1 of these 
individuals involved in decision-making do not understand the mechanisms that 
are (and are not) available to them. Families and members of the public are 
educated through the media regarding mental heath issues, and this information is 
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often inaccurate. Funds for the education of members of the Consent and Capacity 
Board must be provided. A report., commissioned by the Minister of Health, 
Elizabeth Witmer, and presented in June of 1998, stated: 
[olur government has an to ensure that professionals, 
providers, consurners/survivors and their families, and the broader 
public are educated about our province's l eg i~ la t ion .~~~ [emphasis 
added] 
It should be remembered, however, that because of the complexity of the law, 
some people with genuine concem for persons with mental ilInesses will advocate 
reform in order to correct a perceived inadequacy in the legislation that they feel is 
detrimental to the voluntary, treatment incapable patient who resists treatment. It 
is difficult to envision what such change would do to affect other penons with 
mental illnesses, without a thorough understanding of the law in Ontario, as it is 
currently drafted, and as it has been interpreted by the judiciary. Sources to assist 
with such understanding are not readily available. It is hoped that this thesis can 
be used to foster such understanding. 
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